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Introduction
This report is an account on regulatory oversight in the field of nuclear energy provided 
by the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) to the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
and Employment (TEM) once a year as required by Section 121 of the Nuclear Energy Decree 
(161/1988). The report will also be provided to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, the 
Ministry of the Environment, the Finnish Environment Institute and to the environmental 
authorities of the nuclear facility municipalities.
The report is a summary of regulatory oversight of safety in the use of nuclear energy 
performed by STUK and of the related results in 2020. STUK’s nuclear safety regulation, as 
presented in the report, covers the essential oversight data related to the design, construction, 
commissioning, operation and decommissioning of nuclear facilities. In addition, the report 
covers similar data on other uses of nuclear energy, including nuclear waste management 
and nuclear materials. In addition to actual oversight of safety, the report describes, among 
other things, the development and implementation of the regulations concerning the use of 
nuclear energy during the year and the main characteristics of the safety research programmes 
pertaining to nuclear safety and nuclear waste management in Finland.
The report appendices contain significant events at the nuclear power plants and inspection 
summaries of STUK’s inspection programmes. In addition, a summary of the licences 
accordant with the Nuclear Energy Act granted by STUK in 2020, as required by the Nuclear 
Energy Decree, is appended to the report.
STUK’s Financial Statements and Annual Report 2020 includes an assessment of meeting the 
performance targets under the performance agreement between the Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Health and STUK also in view of regulatory oversight in the use of nuclear energy.
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1 Development and implementation 
of the regulations
Amendments to the Nuclear Energy Act and the Nuclear Energy Decree
In 2020, STUK contributed to several of the main statute preparation projects for which the 
MEAE was responsible. 
The preparation of the amendment bill on the security arrangements pertaining to the 
use of nuclear energy was continued through cooperation between the MEAE and STUK. The 
bill included amendments to the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987), Section 21 of the Security 
Clearance Act (726/2014) and the Mining Act (621/2011). The MEAE presented Government 
billl (HE 8/2020) on security arrangements at the Government General Session in February 
2020, where it was also approved. The amendment bill was discussed in the Constitutional 
Committee and the Commerce Committee. The Act amending the Nuclear Energy Act 
(964/2020) entered into force on 21 December 2020. The main objective of the amendment is 
to improve nuclear and radiation safety by responding to newly identified security threats that 
cannot be addressed and prevented with the powers of current legislation.
The Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988) was amended in certain parts (1039/2020) in 
2020. The amendments were related to the amendment and addition needs arising from 
the radiation legislation and the underlying EU Basic Safety Standards Directive (2013/59/
Euratom, BSS directive) and from the Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste Directive (2011/70/
Euratom). At the same time, the regulation on security arrangements, among other things, was 
repealed from the Decree and included in the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987) as basic regulation 
falling under the scope of legislation.
During the course of the year, STUK also participated in the REILA work group steered by 
the MEAE on the development of the regulation of the lifecycle of nuclear facilities, the term 
of which ended in summer 2020. As a result, a final report was published, and in this report, 
the work group concluded that initiating overall legislation reformation is necessary. This 
need partly arises from the lack of clarity in the current legislation but it is also caused by the 
changes in the operating environment.
Update of STUK’s regulations issued by virtue of the Nuclear Energy Act 
By virtue of Section 7 q of the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987), STUK is authorised to issue more 
specific regulations on the technical details of the principles and requirements laid down in 
Chapter 2a of the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987). STUK has issued five regulations under this 
authorisation.
The Regulation on the Security in the Use of Nuclear Energy (STUK Y/3/2020) entered into 
force on December 29 2020. The regulation update was prepared by STUK at the same time as 
the amendment (964/2020) to the Nuclear Energy Act concerning safety regulations. STUK 
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has also investigated the need to update the Regulation on the Safety of Mining and Milling 
Operations Aimed at Producing Uranium or Thorium (STUK Y/5/2016). In this context, it has 
been stated that updating the regulationt would require amendments to the Nuclear Energy 
Act, and thus the preparation of the regulation has been suspended for the time being. 
Update and implementation of the YVL Guides
Section 7r of the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987) provides that STUK has the power to issue 
detailed safety requirements concerning the implementation of the safety level in accordance 
with the Nuclear Energy Act. According to this Section, STUK shall specify the safety 
requirements it sets in accordance with the safety sectors involved in the use of nuclear energy, 
and publish them as part of the regulations issued by STUK. STUK’s nuclear safety guides 
(YVL Guides) are considered binding just as regulations are, but unlike with regulations, the 
possibility of deviating from the requirements is provided for. STUK’s safety requirements 
are binding on the licensee, while preserving the licensee’s right to propose an alternative 
procedure or solution to that provided for in the regulations. If the licensee can convincingly 
demonstrate that the proposed procedure or solution will implement the safety standards of 
the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987), STUK may approve the procedure or solution.
As part of the update of the nuclear safety regulations, STUK’s YVL Guides have also been 
updated. The round of updates of the YVL Guides involved mainly clarifications, changes to the 
regulation references and minor changes to the requirements. In the update of the YVL Guides, 
a particular goal was also to reduce the administrative burden. During 2020, STUK published 8 
updated YVL Guides with explanatory memorandums in Finnish and English: YVL Guides C.5, 
E.8, E.9 and E.10 in January, YVL Guides A.1, D.3 and E.4 in March and YVL Guide E.6 in June. 
In addition, a new YVL Guide E.13 “Ventilation and air-conditioning equipment of a nuclear 
facility” was published in October. The last updated YVL Guides A.11 and A.12 were prepared 
together with the update of Regulation STUK Y/3/2020 and will be published in early 2021. 
The YVL Guides apply to new nuclear facilities. With regard to operating nuclear facilities 
and those under construction, the YVL Guides will be brought into effect through STUK’s 
separate implementing decisions. For the implementation of the updated YVL Guides, STUK 
has requested, via requests for clarifications sent after the publications of the guides, the 
licensees and licence applicants to submit a justified assessment of the fulfilment of the 
requirements presented in the YVL Guides. Processing of the fulfilment assessments submitted 
by the licensees started at STUK in late 2019, and some implementation decisions taken 
based on them were completed during 2020. The remaining implementation decisions will be 
finalised in 2021.
STUK’s comprehensive update of the nuclear safety regulations
In October 2020, STUK adopted the decision to begin the preparation of the structural and 
substantive update of the safety regulations on the use of nuclear energy. The aim of the 
renewal of the nuclear safety regulations and guides issued under the Nuclear Energy Act 
(990/1987) is to emphasise the licensee's responsibility and to focus the oversight based on 
risk-informed methods, and to make a clear difference between recommendations and binding 
requirements. 
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2 Results of regulatory oversight 
of nuclear facilities in 2020
The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the control of nuclear energy use
At the beginning of March, STUK required licensees to submit an account on how the nuclear 
power plants were prepared for the potential COVID-19 pandemic to ensure their operational 
safety, security arrangements and emergency response operations. Based on the accounts 
received, STUK was able to ensure that the licensees were sufficiently prepared for the 
pandemic. Already at an early stage, the licensees introduced extensive measures to prevent 
the spread of COVID-19 at the power plants.
After the restrictions caused by COVID-19 pandemic were imposed, STUK inspectors have 
mostly been working remotely. This reorganisation of work has not reduced or impacted the 
quality of the monitoring programme. Most of STUK’s supervision is based on document 
review, and this work continued as usual remotely. Inspections have largely been carried out 
remotely and positive experience has been gathered in this regard. The precondition for remote 
inspections is that STUK receives all the information it needs from the inspection and can use 
this information to assess the state of safety and verify compliance with the regulations.
The COVID-19 pandemic has had the biggest impact on STUK monitoring carried out at 
plant sites and abroad. During the spring, STUK only carried out the inspections deemed 
necessary on-site at the nuclear power plants. During 2020, on-site supervision and inspections 
have been carried out more often than usual by STUK’s local inspectors who normally work 
at the plant sites. Manufacturing monitoring abroad has been carried out by means of 
compensatory procedures, such as via remote connections and by transferring inspections 
from factories to the plant sites.
Despite the exceptional circumstances, the Finnish nuclear power plants have operated 
normally in 2020, and the measures taken to prevent the spread of COVID-19 have not been 
found to have had any adverse effects on the safety of their operations. Under exceptional 
circumstances, the responsible activities of licensees and nuclear plant personnel are 
emphasised and STUK has not observed any shortcomings in this regard.
2.1 Loviisa 1 and 2 
STUK oversaw the safety of the Loviisa nuclear power plant and assessed its organisation in 
different areas by reviewing materials provided by the licensee, carrying out inspections in line 
with the periodic inspection programme and the YVL Guides, and by overseeing operations at 
the plant. On the basis of this regulatory oversight, STUK can state that as regards radiation 
exposure, the activities of the Loviisa nuclear power plant are safe to the employees, the 
population and the environment.
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2.1 LOVIISA 1 AND 2
Radiation doses for the Loviisa power plant staff have decreased in the 2000s due to, among 
other things, the development of work methods and systems and the minimisation of parts 
containing highly activated substances in accordance with the ALARA principle. Radiation 
doses are higher in even years, when an extensive annual outage is carried out at one of the 
plant units (in 2020 at Loviisa 1).
According to the Government Decree on Ionising Radiation (1034/2018), the effective 
radiation dose to persons engaged in radiation work must not exceed 20 mSv per year. The 
actual individual radiation doses remained clearly below this limit. The highest personal dose 
received at the Loviisa power plant in 2020 was 11.7 mSv caused by insulation work. 
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FIGURE 5. Gamma activity of the liquid effluents (Bq), Loviisa.
During the 2020 annual outages, preliminary installations for the partial replacement 
of plant protection were made at both plant units and Loviisa 1 also underwent an I&C 
replacement of one of the emergency diesel generators, the replacement of the low-frequency 
converters of the control rod mechanisms and the last replacement of the high-pressure 
safety injection system pump engine. In addition, Loviisa 1’s annual outage included extensive 
inspections conducted every eight years (including an internal inspection of the reactor 
pressure vessel) and pressure tests, as well as a tightness test of the containment building 
supervised by STUK. 
The descriptions of the annual outages and the most significant events are presented in 
Appendix 2, and the summaries of the inspections in accordance with the periodic inspection 
programme are presented in Appendix 3.
2.1.1 Safe operation of the plant
Radiation safety of the plant, personnel and environment
The collective occupational radiation dose of the employees in 2020 was 0.54 manSv at Loviisa 
1 and 0.36 manSv at Loviisa 2. Most of this accumulated from work completed during the 
annual outage of the plant: 0.49 manSv at Loviisa 1 and 0.34 manSv at Loviisa 2.
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2.1 LOVIISA 1 AND 2
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2.1 LOVIISA 1 AND 2
Radioactive releases into the air and sea remained clearly below the set limits. The 
calculated radiation dose of the most exposed individual in the vicinity of the plant was less 
than 1% of the limit of 100 microsieverts set in the Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988).
A total of approximately 450 samples were collected and analysed from the land and marine 
environment surrounding the Loviisa power plant in 2020. The measured concentrations were 
so low that they are insignificant in terms of radiation safety of the environment or people. 
The exposure to radioactivity of residents in the vicinity of the nuclear power plant was also 
measured. No radioactive substances originating from the Loviisa power plant were detected in 
them.
Operational events and operating experience feedback
Fortum informed STUK of 8 events in 2020. In addition, STUK requested information on 5 
other events identified by Fortum. One of the reports submitted by Fortum was a response 
to STUK’s clarification request regarding the up-to-dateness of plant site documentation. 
As a conclusion, STUK can state that Fortum identifies operational events at the plants and 
initiates event investigations to determine the causes and to improve the operations of the 
plant and the organisation. Most of the events revealed areas for improvement in procedures 
and activities. The most important operational events are described in Appendix 2. The second 
event investigation (root cause analysis) mentioned in the Annual Report 2019 was also 
completed in 2020 regarding the shortcomings detected in the design and implementation of 
the renewal of cooling water lines of the emergency diesel generators.
By reviewing the results of the event investigations, STUK verified that Fortum had 
investigated the underlying causes of the events and had initiated the necessary measures to 
correct technical faults and deficiencies in its organisation’s operations and to prevent the 
reoccurrence of such events. By the end of 2020, STUK had reviewed 11 reports. In two of the 
cases, STUK considered that investigation of the causes regarding the organisation’s activities 
was insufficient and required supplementation to the reports. In other respects, STUK deemed 
Fortum’s event investigations sufficient. STUK will review two reports submitted at the end 
of 2020 at the beginning of 2021. Based on its observations, STUK focused on the activities of 
individuals and the organisation in the event investigation during its periodic inspection of 
the management of human factors. STUK observed that the use of expertise in this area had 
decreased since the 2017 inspection. STUK required Fortum to strengthen the utilisation of 
expertise in human and organisational activities in the investigation of internal operating 
events.
During its 2017 and 2018 inspections, STUK had stated that there was room for 
improvement for Fortum to learn from Loviisa power plant’s own operating experiences, as 
similar events kept reoccurring and there were deficiencies, for example, in the presentation 
of observations as well as in the definition and implementation of corrective measures. Based 
on its inspection findings, STUK had required that the line organisation’s role in learning 
from its own operating experiences had to be improved. Based on the plan presented by 
Fortum, STUK considered it necessary to intensify its own monitoring in order to control the 
progress of development measures. In 2020, STUK stated via a clarification request that it is 
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2.1 LOVIISA 1 AND 2
unable to verify the adequacy of the effects of Fortum’s improvement measures to remove the 
deficiencies. A clear and justified connection between STUK’s inspection observations and 
the measures launched by Fortum remains unclear. STUK assessed the issue as a whole when 
preparing the periodic safety review of the Loviisa power plant.
According to STUK’s view, the 2020 event reports submitted to STUK by Fortum brought 
up at least component failures, which resulted in reduction of plant unit capacity (4 events), 
deficiencies in Fortum’s design and implementation of modifications (3 events) and a deviation 
from the Operational Limits and Conditions related to the cooling of spent fuel (1 event in 
2020, 3 events in 2018). STUK paid attention to the small number of events reported to STUK 
compared to previous years and also to the fact that several events falling under STUK’s 
supervisory responsibility were not reported to STUK without a separate request. STUK 
concluded that discussions must be held with Fortum on STUK’s expectations regarding the 
submission of event reports.
Annual outages and maintenance operations
The annual outages of the power plants were implemented as planned in terms of nuclear and 
radiation safety. Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, the annual outages at both plant units were 
carried out to the extent originally planned. In addition to refuelling and modifications, a large 
number of maintenance measures and inspections were carried out during the annual outage 
to ensure the safe and reliable operation of the power plant.
One important aspect in terms of ageing management was the further work carried out on 
the plant’s I&C reform, which was concluded in 2018.
Inspections of the pressure equipment were also carried out during the annual outage 
in accordance with the periodic plan approved by STUK. Tightness test of the containment 
building and pressure tests on the plant’s primary and secondary circuits were also carried out 
at Loviisa 1 as well as a considerable number of additional inspections due to the observations 
of the Loviisa 1 reactor pressure vessel’s foreign material monitoring system.
More information on the annual outages is available in Appendix 2, and a summary of the 
periodic inspections carried out during the annual outage is included in Appendix 3.
Operational waste management 
The processing, storage and disposal of low and intermediate level waste (operational waste) 
at the Loviisa power plant were carried out as planned. The volume and activity of operational 
waste in relation to reactor power remained low compared with most other countries. The 
on-going waste management development projects at the power plant, including for example 
solidification of liquid waste, repackaging of old waste barrels, design of a new repository, 
procurement of measurements for the clearance of metal waste from regulatory control and 
the development of waste accounting procedures have progressed as planned. The goal of the 
development projects is to improve operational efficiency and reduce the amount of waste 
destined for final disposal. 
In June, STUK carried out a periodic inspection on the processing and storage of reactor 
waste, which focused on Loviisa power plant’s waste management resources, competence and 
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2.1 LOVIISA 1 AND 2
instructions as well as the current measures of nuclear waste management. The inspection 
summary is provided in Appendix 3. 
During 2020, Fortum started the disposal of solidified waste packages in the solidified 
waste space of the final disposal facility for low and intermediate level waste commissioned at 
the end of 2019. Once all the solidified waste packages have been moved to the final disposal 
facility, the interim storage of solidified waste packages in the maintenance waste space for low 
and intermediate level waste will end. The interim storage licence issued by STUK is valid until 
the end of 2021. 
In September 2020, Fortum submitted to STUK for approval a periodic safety review of 
Loviisa’s disposal facility for low and intermediate waste, and STUK has started to process the 
material.
STUK’s oversight and inspections indicate that the Loviisa plant’s power plant waste 
management has been developed in a goal-oriented manner and meets the requirements as a 
whole.
Nuclear safeguards
STUK granted Fortum three licences concerning the use of nuclear commodities (see 
Appendix 7). 
STUK approved the updated version of Fortum’s nuclear safeguards manual. In the 
manual, Fortum describes how the nuclear safeguards of the Loviisa nuclear power plant 
units have been organised. Fortum submitted the nuclear safeguards reports and notifications 
it was responsible for in time, and they were consistent with the observations made during 
inspections.
In 2020, a total of 11 nuclear safeguards inspections were conducted at the Loviisa power 
plant. STUK performed an inspection pertaining to the physical inventory verification of 
nuclear materials together with the IAEA and the European Commission both before and after 
the annual outage. Furthermore, STUK inspected the locations of the fuel assemblies in the 
reactors of Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 2 prior to the closing of the reactor covers. The IAEA and the 
Commission carried out one inspection on short notice in the material balance area at the 
Loviisa power plant. No remarks were made in the inspections.
The oversight and inspections by STUK indicated that the Loviisa plant fulfilled its nuclear 
safeguards obligations in 2020.
Security arrangements
The oversight indicated that the level of security arrangements at the Loviisa power plant has 
remained good and the security arrangements (including information security) have been 
purposefully developed.
At the end of 2020, Fortum updated the plant security plan, the power plant waste 
repository (VLJ repository) security plan and the radiation sources security plan as well as its 
review on their compliance with the requirements of design basis threat in the use of nuclear 
energy. STUK will evaluate these documents, among other things, in connection with the 
plant’s periodic safety review in 2021.
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2.1 LOVIISA 1 AND 2
In 2020, STUK carried out two periodic inspections of the security arrangements concerning 
the nuclear power plant’s physical security arrangements and information security. 
Based on these inspections, no requirements concerning security arrangements or 
information security were presented. The summary of the inspections is provided in 
Appendix 3.
Fire safety
Fire safety at the Loviisa power plant is at a good level. In 2020, STUK carried out a periodic 
inspection regarding fire security. No requirements were issued in the inspection. The 
summary of the inspections is provided in Appendix 3.
Furthermore, STUK oversaw the fire safety of the power plant by means of site visits and by 
reviewing reports submitted by Fortum. The oversight focused on the implementation of fire 
protection arrangements during annual outages. 
Fire safety was further improved in 2020 by permanently closing some high-risk doors at 
Loviisa 2 based on the results of the plant’s fire PRA. This will prevent a potential fire from 
spreading through the door.
2.1.2 Technical condition of the plant and preparing for exceptional events
Development of the plant and its safety
Several reform projects that will improve plant safety are currently in progress at the Loviisa 
nuclear power plant. The most significant of these was the plant’s I&C reform, which was 
implemented in 2016–2018. In 2020, the modernisation of I&C systems continued with 
smaller entities to ensure the service life of systems that were not included in the 2018 
reform. Preliminary work to partially reform protection I&C systems was carried out at both 
plant units – the actual installation will take place during the 2021 annual outages. The low-
frequency converters of the control rod mechanisms were replaced in full at Loviisa 1. As 
regards Loviisa 2, Fortum will make a decision on the possible replacement later. The I&C of 
one of the Loviisa 1’s emergency diesel generators’ machine units was also replaced – the I&C 
of the remaining three machine units will be replaced one at a time during the coming years. 
There are no plans for such replacements at Loviisa 2. Parts obtained from Loviisa 1 will be 
stored, so that they will act as spare parts for Loviisa 2, if needed.
For the part of the modifications started as a result of the assessments done due to the 
Fukushima accident, the installation of the make-up water system to ensure the cooling of 
fuel pools and spent fuel storage pools under highly exceptional circumstances, which was 
started in 2017, was finalised. The mechanical parts of the system were completed during the 
2018 annual outage, and the pump and I&C were finalised during the 2019 annual outage. The 
final commissioning was completed towards the end of 2020, after all of the issues identified 
in the trial operations during the 2019 annual outage had been corrected. All the plant safety 
improvements initiated as a result of the Fukushima accident have now been completed.
Other ageing-management related modernisation projects carried out at the Loviisa power 
plant in 2020 included the reactor hall refuelling machine and the replacement of the cooling 
unit of Loviisa 1 emergency diesel unit, which has been waiting for operating experiences from 
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2.1 LOVIISA 1 AND 2
the revisions made at Loviisa 2 as a result of several leakages in 2019. Further details on the 
consequences of the leaks are provided in Appendix 2.
Reports and analyses
Fortum submitted to STUK seismic hazard reports updated in spring 2019, according to which 
the expected ground accelerations are higher than previously estimated. The ground response 
spectrum determined in the report is needed to prepare seismic durability assessments of 
buildings and equipment. The processing of the reports regarding the seismic hazard has 
continued in 2020. During its inspection, STUK took into account the observations of the 
simultaneously ongoing investigation on seismic hazard sensitivity studies (SENSEI). 
Upon completion of the analyses assessing the seismic durability of buildings and 
equipment, Fortum will update its probabilistic risk assessment concerning the plant’s seismic 
events. Based on the results, Fortum will further define possible corrective measures to ensure 
that equipment critical to safety can withstand the plant’s updated design basis earthquake. 
STUK will investigate the issue as part of the periodic safety review of the Loviisa plant.
During 2020, Fortum has also updated a large number of analyses related to ageing 
management as part of Loviisa’s periodic safety review. Fortum submitted the analyses to STUK 
for assessment at the end of 2020. The analyses include, for example, deterministic safety 
analysis of the reactor pressure vessel, fatigue and loading analyses, and reports on the ageing 
management of the main components. STUK will inspects the reports as part of Loviisa’s 
periodic safety review during 2021.
Emergency response arrangements
STUK oversaw the ability of the Loviisa power plant emergency response organisation to 
act under exceptional conditions by making inspection visits and reviewing reports and 
emergency response plan updates submitted by Fortum. A periodic inspection was also 
prepared on emergency activities, the summary of which is presented in Appendix 3. No events 
requiring emergency response actions took place at the Loviisa power plant in 2020.
The emergency exercise scheduled for May had to be cancelled because to the COVID-19 
pandemic. After the epidemic settled in the summer, the plans for the emergency exercise were 
resumed and the exercise was held in November. During the exercise, the STUK emergency 
response organisation practiced the activities in an emergency situation in the STUK 
emergency centre with reduced staff. STUK participated in the work of the exercise planning 
group.
In STUK’s view, Fortum has systematically developed the Loviisa power plant’s emergency 
response operations, and the plant’s emergency response arrangements comply with all the key 
requirements. 
2.1.3  Organisational operations and quality management
STUK has supervised the Loviisa power plant’s competence and resources management in 
2020, as well as the evaluation of the licensee’s own activities as described in the management 
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system. Summaries of periodic inspections focusing on human resources and competence, 
management system and management of human factors are presented in Appendix 3. 
The periodic inspection on human resources and competence covered the system managers’ 
resource and competence management procedures. As a result of the inspection, STUK issued 
a requirement that deputies must be appointed to all system managers of systems that are 
critical to the safety of the nuclear power plant. The inspection also covered supervisory work 
at the Loviisa power plant. Based on the inspection, STUK stated that the management of 
the power plant, Fortum Group, the power plant HR section and training group are among 
the parties in charge of the induction, training and operating conditions of supervisors, but 
the expectations and practices related to the supervisory and managerial duties at the Loviisa 
power plant have not been defined as a whole and systematically considering the requirements 
of the nuclear sector. 
The periodic inspection focused on the management system covered the development of 
independent assessment of nuclear safety and the procedures applied by Fortum to manage the 
deviations and risks associated with its operations. The licensee organisation’s specification 
principles were also discussed. Based on the inspection, STUK stated that the independent 
operational assessment of the licensee’s Loviisa power plant has been transferred to the plant’s 
nuclear safety unit in 2020. STUK will monitor the further development of operations under 
its monitoring. With regard to deviation management, STUK required Fortum to account for 
the delays in the performance of corrective measures related to its operations. As regards risk 
management, the licensee has started to develop its operations based on self-assessment. 
STUK carried out an additional inspection of Fortum's management of human factors 
related to safety in order to verify that it meets the standards that have been further specified 
as a result of changes to the regulations. As a result of the inspection, STUK found that Fortum 
has procedures to manage human factors, for example, in the investigation of events and in 
the planning of major changes to the main control room, but the use of these procedures must 
be increased in order to ensure proper management of human factors in practice. The revised 
regulations require, among other things, more extensive management of human factors in 
the design of plant modifications, and in order to achieve this objective, Fortum must further 
develop its operations.
STUK’s focus in the supervision of Fortum’s safety culture and management has been the 
licensee’s ability to critically evaluate the development targets of its operating culture and 
to lead the necessary procedure changes in such a way that everyone commits to them and 
they are implemented on time. In 2020, the Loviisa plant undertook a more thorough self-
assessment of the safety culture than in previous years and the responsibility for establishing 
an overall picture of nuclear safety was transferred to the plant organisation itself in order to 
strengthen the commitment of line organisation, which STUK considers to be a development 
in the right direction. The identification of concrete change needs related to management 
in particular and the implementation of these changes will continue to be supervised. The 
management of the challenging COVID-19 situation in 2020 was consistent, and, based on 
STUK’s oversight, safety aspects were duly considered in the decision-making during the 
annual outage.
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Periodic safety review
In June 2020, Fortum submitted most of the periodic safety review reports in accordance with 
the terms of the Loviisa nuclear power plant’s operating licence, the rest Fortum submitted at 
the end of 2020. Fortum has to carry out a periodic safety review at least every ten years, and 
the deadline for the documents now submitted was by the end of 2023. The operating licence 
of the Loviisa power plant is valid until the year 2027 for Loviisa 1 and until 2030 for Loviisa 2. 
Furthermore, in autumn 2020, Fortum submitted to STUK a periodic safety review of Loviisa’s 
final disposal facility for low- and intermediate-level waste (VLJ repository). It is estimated 
that the processing of the safety reviews at STUK will take until 2022, at which point STUK will 
finalise its own safety review and issue its decisions.
In autumn 2020, Fortum also launched an environmental impact assessment (EIA) on the 
Loviisa nuclear power plant and associated the final disposal facility for low- and intermediate-
level waste. The EIA programme concerns the potential extension of the use and, alternatively, 
decommissioning of the Loviisa nuclear power plant. STUK submitted its statement on the 
radiation effects of the programme stage to the Ministry of Employment and the Economy in 
October 2020. 
2.2 Olkiluoto 1 and 2
STUK oversaw the safety of the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant and assessed its organisation in 
different areas by reviewing materials provided by the licensee, carrying out inspections in line 
with the periodic inspection programme and the YVL Guides, and by overseeing operations at 
the plant. Summaries of inspections included in the periodic inspection programme for 2020 
are included in Appendix 3.
On the basis of this regulatory oversight, STUK can state that as regards radiation exposure, 
the plant’s activities are safe to the employees, the population and the environment.
2.2.1 Safe operation of the plant
Radiation safety of the plant, personnel and environment
The collective occupational radiation dose of the employees in 2020 was 0.34 manSv at 
Olkiluoto 1 and 0.22 manSv at Olkiluoto 2. Most of this accumulated from work completed 
during the annual outages (0.27 manSv at Olkiluoto 1 and 0.14 manSv at Olkiluoto 2).
According to the Government Decree on Ionising Radiation (1034/2018), the effective 
radiation dose to persons engaged in radiation work must not exceed 20 mSv per year. The 
actual individual radiation doses remained clearly below this limit. The largest annual dose at 
the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant was 7.8 mSv.
Radioactive releases into the air and sea remained clearly below the set limits. The 
calculated radiation dose of the most exposed individual in the vicinity of the plant was less 
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FIGURE 6. Collective occupational doses since the start of operation of the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant.
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2.2.1 Safe operation of the plant
Radiation safety of the plant, personnel and environment
The collective occupational radiation dose of the employees in 2020 was 0.34 manSv at 
Olkiluoto 1 and 0.22 manSv at Olkiluoto 2. Most of this accumulated from work completed 
during the annual outages (0.27 manSv at Olkiluoto 1 and 0.14 manSv at Olkiluoto 2).
According to the Government Decree on Ionising Radiation (1034/2018), the effective 
radiation dose to persons engaged in radiation work must not exceed 20 mSv per year. The 
actual individual radiation doses remained clearly below this limit. The largest annual dose at 
the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant was 7.8 mSv.
Radioactive releases into the air and sea remained clearly below the set limits. The 
calculated radiation dose of the most exposed individual in the vicinity of the plant was less 
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A total of approximately 440 samples were collected and analysed from the land and marine 
environment surrounding the Olkiluoto power plant in 2020. Small amounts of radioactive 
substances originating from the plant were observed in some of the analysed environmental 
samples. The measured concentrations were so low that they are insignificant in terms of 
radiation safety of the environment or people. The exposure to radioactivity of residents in the 
vicinity of the nuclear power plant was also measured. No radioactive substances originating 
from the Olkiluoto power plant were detected in them.
Operational events and operating experience feedback
TVO informed STUK of 17 events in 2020. TVO investigated these events and submitted the 
results of the event investigations also to STUK. One of the event investigation outcome 
reports was a response to STUK’s clarification request regarding the situation of critical spare 
parts and the functioning of the spare parts management. As a conclusion, STUK can state that 
TVO identifies operational events at the plants and initiates event investigations to determine 
the causes and to improve the operations of the plant and the organisation. Most of the events 
revealed areas for improvement in procedures and activities. Olkiluoto 2’s emergency situation 
(10 December 2020) that triggered the activities of emergency response organisations at both 
TVO and STUK is highlighted as a single event. The most important operational events are 
described in Appendix 2.
By reviewing the results of the event investigations, STUK verified that TVO had 
investigated the underlying causes of the events and had initiated the necessary actions 
to correct technical faults and deficiencies in its organisation’s operations and prevent the 
reoccurrence of such events. By the end of 2020, STUK had reviewed 14 reports. TVO decided to 
submit supplements to the three reports. STUK deemed TVO’s event investigations sufficient. 
STUK will review three reports at the beginning of 2021, as TVO submitted them to STUK for 
processing at the end of 2020 and the beginning of 2021.
In STUK’s view, some of the same topics emerge from among the 2020 events as from the 
events of previous years. This may possibly be due to the fact that the implementation of 
the measures TVO has previously launched is still underway and are yet to take effect or that 
TVO has failed to initiate sufficient measures based on previous events. STUK will take these 
observations into account in the planning and targeting of its control.  
Annual outages and maintenance operations
The annual outages of the plant units were implemented as planned in terms of nuclear and 
radiation safety. As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, TVO postponed some of the work 
planned to be carried out at Olkiluoto 1 to a later date. This way, TVO was able to reduce the 
number of workers involved in annual outage and thus protect the workers from contracting 
COVID-19. The maintenance work postponed by TVO included tasks that did not need to 
be completed immediately. For example, STUK approved the primary circuit pressure test 
required in connection with the renewal of the operating licence to be carried out during the 
2021 annual outage. The decision was supported by the results of the strength analyses of the 
reactor pressure vessel and positive experiences from a pressure test performed at Olkiluoto 2 
in 2019.
STUK monitored the annual outages from their design to the start-up of the plant units. 
STUK had to slightly adapt its inspection and control routines due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 
For example, STUK only carried out inspections deemed necessary onsite and supervised the 
annual outage with the help of remote connections more than before.
A large number of maintenance measures and inspections were also carried out during 
the 2020 annual outage to ensure the safe and reliable operation of the power plant. Non-
destructive in-service inspections of pressure equipment were implemented in compliance 
with an in-service inspection programme approved by STUK. More information about annual 
outages of the plant units and STUK’s regulatory oversight is available in Appendix 2. During 
the annual outage, STUK carried out a periodic inspection of annual outages. The inspection 
summary is provided in Appendix 3.
Operational waste management
The processing, storage and disposal of low and intermediate level waste (operational waste) at 
the Olkiluoto power plant were carried out as planned. The volume and activity of operational 
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(10 December 2020) that triggered the activities of emergency response organisations at both 
TVO and STUK is highlighted as a single event. The most important operational events are 
described in Appendix 2.
By reviewing the results of the event investigations, STUK verified that TVO had 
investigated the underlying causes of the events and had initiated the necessary actions 
to correct technical faults and deficiencies in its organisation’s operations and prevent the 
reoccurrence of such events. By the end of 2020, STUK had reviewed 14 reports. TVO decided to 
submit supplements to the three reports. STUK deemed TVO’s event investigations sufficient. 
STUK will review three reports at the beginning of 2021, as TVO submitted them to STUK for 
processing at the end of 2020 and the beginning of 2021.
In STUK’s view, some of the same topics emerge from among the 2020 events as from the 
events of previous years. This may possibly be due to the fact that the implementation of 
the measures TVO has previously launched is still underway and are yet to take effect or that 
TVO has failed to initiate sufficient measures based on previous events. STUK will take these 
observations into account in the planning and targeting of its control.  
Annual outages and maintenance operations
The annual outages of the plant units were implemented as planned in terms of nuclear and 
radiation safety. As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, TVO postponed some of the work 
planned to be carried out at Olkiluoto 1 to a later date. This way, TVO was able to reduce the 
number of workers involved in annual outage and thus protect the workers from contracting 
COVID-19. The maintenance work postponed by TVO included tasks that did not need to 
be completed immediately. For example, STUK approved the primary circuit pressure test 
required in connection with the renewal of the operating licence to be carried out during the 
2021 annual outage. The decision was supported by the results of the strength analyses of the 
reactor pressure vessel and positive experiences from a pressure test performed at Olkiluoto 2 
in 2019.
STUK monitored the annual outages from their design to the start-up of the plant units. 
STUK had to slightly adapt its inspection and control routines due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 
For example, STUK only carried out inspections deemed necessary onsite and supervised the 
annual outage with the help of remote connections more than before.
A large number of maintenance measures and inspections were also carried out during 
the 2020 annual outage to ensure the safe and reliable operation of the power plant. Non-
destructive in-service inspections of pressure equipment were implemented in compliance 
with an in-service inspection programme approved by STUK. More information about annual 
outages of the plant units and STUK’s regulatory oversight is available in Appendix 2. During 
the annual outage, STUK carried out a periodic inspection of annual outages. The inspection 
summary is provided in Appendix 3.
Operational waste management
The processing, storage and disposal of low and intermediate level waste (operational waste) at 
the Olkiluoto power plant were carried out as planned. The volume and activity of operational 
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power plant pays attention to keeping the amount of waste generated as low as possible by 
tightly packing the waste and releasing from control waste with so low a level of radioactivity 
that no special measures are needed. TVO has continued its work on harmonising the 
solidification processes of all three plant units and has launched an environmental impact 
assessment of the underground final disposal of very low-level waste.
In 2020, STUK carried out an inspection on the transfer of operational waste and 
fuel within the site area. The inspection focused on radiation protection aspects as well 
as transport and security arrangements related to the transfer. STUK also assessed the 
preparation and actual transfer of solidified waste from the power plant to the operational 
waste repository and the related TVO guidelines. No significant deficiencies were detected in 
the inspection, but some development needs related to guidance were identified.
Nuclear safeguards
STUK granted TVO ten licences concerning the use of nuclear commodities for the Olkiluoto 
plant units in operation (see Appendix 7).
TVO submitted the nuclear safeguards reports and notifications it was responsible for in 
time, and they were consistent with the observations made during inspections. STUK approved 
the update of TVO’s nuclear safeguards manual. In the manual, TVO describes how the nuclear 
safeguards of Olkiluoto nuclear power plant units have been organised. In addition, STUK 
approved TVO’s update of the accountancy and safeguards manual for international transfers 
of nuclear materials. In December, TVO submitted to the European Commission the updated 
Basic Technical Characteristics (BTC) of the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 plant units and the spent fuel 
storage.
A total of 15 nuclear safeguards inspections were carried out in the material balance areas 
of TVO’s operating plant units and the spent fuel storage facility, including inspections of the 
entire power plant area and TVO’s nuclear safeguards system. STUK performed, together with 
the IAEA and the European Commission, inspections on the physical inventory of nuclear 
materials at both plant units and the spent nuclear fuel storage facility both before and after 
the annual outages. Furthermore, STUK inspected the locations of the fuel assemblies in the 
reactors of Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2 prior to the closing of the reactor covers. STUK also 
performed periodic inspections of nuclear safeguards at both plant units and at the spent fuel 
storage facility. STUK also participated in an inspection carried out by the IAEA at Olkiluoto 1 
on short notice in November. No remarks were made in the inspections. 
The oversight and inspections by STUK indicated that the Olkiluoto plant units in 
operation fulfilled their nuclear safeguards obligations.
Security arrangements
In 2020, STUK carried out one periodic inspection regarding nuclear security. Inspection 
targets included risk and deviation management, both in terms of physical security 
arrangements and information security. In order to maintain and improve both physical 
security arrangements and information security procedures, several development projects 
are ongoing and underway at Olkiluoto. STUK considers these to be good and necessary. The 
inspection summary is provided in Appendix 3. 
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The security arrangements comprise an extensive package of administrative, technical and 
operational procedures. The whole formed by the security arrangements is at the required level.
Fire safety
In 2020, STUK oversaw the fire safety of the power plant by means of inspections and site 
visits during the annual outage and by reviewing reports submitted by TVO. Fire safety at the 
Olkiluoto power plant is at an acceptable level.
2.2.2 Technical condition of the plant and preparing for exceptional events
Development of the plant and its safety
For the part of the modifications started as a result of the assessments done due to the 
Fukushima accident, the auxiliary feedwater system’s dependence on seawater cooling has 
been significantly reduced at the Olkiluoto plant units in operation. The modification was 
carried out at Olkiluoto 1 already in 2014. Abnormal vibrations and sounds were nevertheless 
observed during the test run in one new recirculation line. TVO has investigated the issue and 
solved the problems related to piping vibration, for example, by improving piping supports, 
which established the basis for continuing the modification work at Olkiluoto 2 as well. 
TVO completed the last two subsystem installations in the 2020 annual outage, after which 
the recirculating line modification has been implemented in all Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2 
subsystems. STUK supervised the installation work and test runs and approved the results 
reports. All the plant safety improvements initiated as a result of the Fukushima accident have 
now been completed.
In the emergency diesel generator update project, the plant’s eight emergency diesel 
generators will be replaced and a ninth generator, enabling the replacement of diesel 
generators during power operation, was also introduced in 2020 In autumn 2020, the 
replacement of the existing diesel generators was started by replacing one Olkiluoto 1 diesel 
generator and initiating its disassembly and replacement work. The remaining emergency 
diesel generators will be installed and commissioned one by one by spring 2025. The new diesel 
generators can be cooled with seawater and air. The current ones can be cooled only with 
seawater. STUK is overseeing the upgrade and in 2020 inspected its related design documents 
and oversaw the manufacture and testing on site.
An alternative float chamber-based trip that meets the diversity principle has been 
designed for the essential function of reactor water level measurement. In conjunction with 
the renewal of the operating licence, TVO proposed that the modification is intended to be 
implemented between 2019 and 2021. At the end of 2018, TVO submitted an application to 
STUK for approval, according to which the work will not yet be started in the 2019 annual 
outages. TVO has reassessed the risks related to the installation against the possible benefits of 
the modification and proposes that the preparation of the implementation in accordance with 
the current model be interrupted for further investigation. In 2020, TVO submitted to STUK 
for approval failure and common cause failure analyses related to the reactor pressure vessel’s 
surface measurement and a plan for safety improvements. However, further clarifications have 
been requested from TVO, based on which STUK will assess the adequacy of the measures in 
more detail. TVO must submit final clarifications and an action plan in spring 2021.
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TVO has launched a project to renew the refuelling machines of the plant units. The 
modification involves the renewal of the mechanical devices and electrical and I&C system 
of the refuelling machines. The reason for this modification is the reduced availability of 
the existing refuelling machines, the difficult availability of spare parts and challenging 
maintenance. The new refuelling machines are more reliable, reducing interruptions during 
annual outages due to the refuelling machines. STUK approved the conceptual plan for the 
new refuelling machines in February 2020. STUK will monitor the design, construction, 
installations and commissioning of the new refuelling machines. The project is planned to be 
completed during 2025.
Emergency response arrangements
STUK oversaw the ability of the Olkiluoto power plant emergency response organisation 
to act under exceptional conditions by making inspection visits and reviewing reports and 
emergency response plan updates submitted by TVO. 
An extensive emergency exercise led by the Satakunta Rescue Department was held in 
December, but as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, the exercise was shorter than originally 
planned. During the exercise, the STUK emergency response organisation practiced the 
activities in an emergency situation mainly via remote connections. STUK participated in the 
work of the exercise planning group.
In 2020, one situation requiring emergency response operations occurred. On 10 December 
2020, an automatic isolation of the containment building occurred at Olkiluoto 2 due to an 
increase in the radiation level of steam pipes, which resulted in the declaration of a site area 
emergency and TVO’s emergency organisation launched its operations in accordance with the 
emergency plan. The activities of the emergency organisation ended with the conclusion of 
the emergency situation in the early hours of 11 December 2020. TVO organisation operated 
mainly in accordance with the plan. A more detailed analysis is underway and TVO is preparing 
summary reports on both the exercise and the site area emergency and will submit them to 
STUK. The incident did not require any protective measures to be taken and did not pose a risk 
to the power plant staff or the local residents.
The emergency response arrangements at the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant have been 
constantly developed, and the power plant’s emergency response arrangements comply with all 
set requirements.
2.2.3 Organisational operations and quality management
In 2020, organisational control focused in particular on the impact of the measures taken to 
prevent the spread of COVID-19 on TVO organisation’s ability to perform its basic task. In order 
to monitor the situation, STUK held regular monitoring meetings with TVO throughout the 
year. Nothing concerning emerged. TVO management’s activities and decisions in managing 
the COVID-19 situation have shown consistent leadership, and, based on observations, the staff 
seem to be committed to observing the exceptional procedures. 
TVO has recruited a large number of people in recent years. STUK’s monitoring has not 
revealed any specific shortcomings in terms of TVO’s competence or resources. The priority 
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of safety has been communicated very clearly in TVO’s internal communication and “Safe 
operation” has been highlighted as a strategic theme. 
Observations made during the annual outage do not reveal any significant new concerns 
related to TVO’s safety culture. Operational decisions related to the events were appropriate 
and conservative. During the annual outage, strict access rights and quarantine regulations 
aimed at preventing the spread of COVID-19 to the plant site were applied at Olkiluoto. TVO 
succeeded in its operations and the experience was positive, particularly in terms of the 
peaceful working conditions at the control room, as access to it was restricted during the 
annual outage.
In 2020, STUK carried out a “Management system, management and safety culture” 
inspection, which addressed issues such as: TVO’s ability to ensure that its suppliers have a 
healthy safety culture. TVO has carried out development work on being better able to assess 
the safety culture of suppliers in procurement, manufacturing and reception activities 
and disseminating information throughout the organisation. TVO has also reorganised its 
operations in charge of technology, such as project activities, in order to further improve 
them. In STUK’s view, these development measures are positive and their effects continue to 
be monitored. The inspection also verified the implementation of the revised requirements 
related to the update of Guide YVL A.3 “Leadership and management for safety” at TVO. The 
inspection summary is provided in Appendix 3.
2.3 Olkiluoto 3 
STUK oversaw the construction of the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit and TVO’s preparation for 
the coming operation stage by reviewing materials provided by the licensee, carrying out 
inspections in line with the inspection programme and the YVL Guides, and overseeing 
operations at the plant. Summaries of the inspections included in the inspection programme 
for 2020 are presented in Appendices 3 and 4. Appendix 3 contains the inspections carried out 
as part of the inspection programme of operating plants. Appendix 4 includes inspections 
focused on verifying Olkiluoto 3’s operational readiness for fuel loading.
The Olkiluoto 3 project is in the commissioning phase, which includes the trial operation 
of components and systems, other preparations for plant operation, such as the production 
of instructions required for operation, personnel training and the completion of emergency 
preparedness and security arrangements. At the same time, the construction and installation 
work is being finalised. 
In 2020, STUK’s oversight practices had to be adapted to the requirements posed by 
the COVID-19 pandemic. The on-site monitoring and inspections necessary for verifying 
Olkiluoto 3’s readiness for fuel loading were carried out as planned. Suitable remote solutions 
were utilised more than usually in monitoring. For example, the commissioning inspections 
organised by the plant and several inspections related to the verification of the plant’s 
readiness for fuel loading were carried out remotely as of spring 2020. 
In spring, TVO submitted to STUK a fuel loading licence application and the related safety 
assessment. In August, TVO published a new project schedule, according to which the fuel 
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loading is scheduled for March 2021. As fuel loading was postponed, STUK required an updated 
fuel loading licence application and safety assessment to be submitted when the plant reached 
readiness for fuel loading.   
Monitoring the tests and repair and modification work formed a large part of STUK’s 
supervision operations in 2020. The oversight of test operations included the inspection of 
test plans and as well as the oversight of selected tests, while the monitoring of the repair and 
modification work included the inspection of plans and deviation reports, as well as on-site 
inspections.
STUK carried out several inspections of functions related to preparations for plant 
operation and oversaw, for example, the plant’s readiness in terms of security arrangements, 
control room operations and the progress of the management system and operating 
procedures. STUK also oversaw the performance of repair, maintenance and modification work 
critical in terms of safety. Based on these oversight measures, STUK observed that most of 
TVO’s procedures and operations are at a good level.
2.3.1 Processing of licensing documents
In 2020, STUK received, among other things, I&C suitability analyses, updated classification 
documents and Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) updates, as well as plans for mechanical 
devices and their updates.
STUK monitored the progress of the I&C component qualification and reviewed the 
suitability analyses of the I&C equipment and systems. According to the schedule, the 
suitability analyses should have been completed during the spring, but the last of them were 
submitted to STUK for processing in December and their processing will continue in 2021. The 
suitability analyses have mainly been of good quality. However, for some standalone systems, 
there have been uncertainties in terms of their radiation resistance, and STUK has requested 
corrections to the documents.
Based on the observations made during test operation and the operating experience of the 
two plant units of the Taishan sister plant in operation in China, changes have been made to 
the plant’s systems. For example, inaccuracies in some measuring instruments that have been 
larger than estimated have led to updates to ensure that the documentation reflects the actual 
behaviour of the plant. In addition, the facility documentation has been updated to reflect the 
results of the trial operation. STUK has inspected and approved the modifications related to 
safety.
2.3.2 Manufacture, installation and construction
STUK continued its oversight of manufacture and installation. 
STUK oversaw the test operation of emergency diesel engines during 2020 and inspected 
the repair and modification work of faults that surfaced in test operation. The cooling water 
pipes of the engines are connected to the engine with steel bellows. The redesign of the 
bellows started as a result of the leaks detected in the trial operation in 2019. Fast stopping 
of the engine in an overspeed situation required the redesign of the overspeed protection 
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valve. The above-mentioned changes were implemented during 2020, in addition to other 
necessary modifications and repairs. During the diesel test run in October, high vibration 
levels were observed at the diesel generator magnetising machine. The vibration issue was 
comprehensively investigated at the end of 2020, resulting in changes to the equipment. STUK 
reviewed the changes. At the end of 2020, these modifications were still underway. After the 
modifications have been completed, diesel test runs will be carried out to demonstrate the 
functionality of the modification work and the achievement of the approved vibration level. 
The demonstration of the functionality and conformity of the emergency diesel generators is 
ongoing and STUK will ensure that the matter is completed before the nuclear fuel is loaded.
During the tightness test carried out in spring 2020, TVO and the plant supplier detected 
a leak in a mechanical control valve of one of the pressuriser safety valves. There are a total 
of three pressuriser safety valves and they are required for the overpressure protection of the 
plant unit’s primary circuit. Each safety valve has two mechanical control valves, one of which 
is separated. Reliable opening and closing of the safety valve depends on the reliable operation 
of the mechanical control valve. In order to investigate the detected leak, the control valve was 
opened, at which point TVO and the plant supplier noticed that the valve stem was broken. 
As a result of the incident, the remaining five mechanical control valves were also opened. 
Cracks were visually observed on the stems of two of the control valves. The damaged parts 
were delivered to Framatome Technical Center in Germany for further investigation to 
determine the root cause of the damage. Pitting caused by impurities leads to hydrogen 
formation, which combined with stress causes stress corrosion in martensitic stainless steel. 
Impurities such as sulphur, chloride and phosphorus were found on the outer surface of the 
stem. As a result of heat treatment, the stem material is in a state known to be vulnerable to 
stress corrosion. As a result of the valve assembly, the stem is also subject to tensile stress. 
The investigations found that all the factors required for stress corrosion were present in the 
damaged part. However, the source of the impurities could not be reliably identified.
The damaged parts have been replaced with corresponding new parts and temporary 
procedures have been introduced to maintain the required level of cleanliness during nuclear 
commissioning. During the last tertile of 2020, the control valves were delivered to Olkiluoto, 
tested and reinstalled. During the first operating cycle of the nuclear power plant, the 
condition of the valves will be monitored by means of additional testing. Furthermore, the 
plant supplier has initiated modification planning aimed at ensuring the reliability of the 
control valves in long-term use.
In relation to this matter, STUK processed and approved applications regarding 
open requirements, such as a deviation report and plans for ensuring cleanliness during 
commissioning. Towards the end of the year, the plant supplier presented a design project 
related to the changes of the control valve. TVO will submit the plans regarding the change to 
STUK before fuel loading. 
In the summer, TVO reported it had discovered insulation damage in conductors in the I&C 
cabinets. Insulation damage can cause a short circuit if the damaged area is in contact with the 
metal parts of the I&C cabinet or with another damaged conductor. TVO and the plant supplier 
inspected all the main I&C system cabinets without touching the conductors to determine the 
extent of the issue and repaired the damaged conductors. In addition, the conductors related 
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to critical safety functions were inspected by moving them inside the cabinet to see any hidden 
faults on the conductors.
As it is possible that some defective conductors remain in the I&C cabinets, TVO assessed 
their impact on plant safety, for example, during seismic events that would cause the I&C 
cabinets to shake, but even in such an event, the impact on the probability of reactor core 
damage remains small based on preliminary assessments. TVO also stated that the defective 
conductors had only caused a few short circuits during the commissioning test prior to the 
repairs. The built-in self-diagnosis of I&C system platforms detects short circuit faults and the 
I&C systems are designed to withstand these faults. The installation instructions related to 
conductors have been improved to prevent such damage in the future.
Regarding this matter, STUK processed the scope of the conductor inspection presented by 
TVO and the preliminary analyses of their impact on safety. STUK made no remarks on these. 
At the end of 2020, TVO submitted to STUK the final analyses and STUK has started to review 
them.
In 2020, STUK processed a deviation report on the heat treatment during the 
manufacturing of steam generators and the pressuriser. The deviation report covered 
temperature overruns and underruns in local heat treatment during factory manufacture 
of steam generators and the pressuriser. The deviation was observed in connection with the 
development of the manufacturer’s new induction-based heat treatment method. According 
to TVO’s assessment, the heat treatment deviation has been assessed conservatively, and the 
deviation has no impact on the safe use of Olkiluoto 3’s steam generators and pressuriser. 
STUK approved the deviation with requirements related to the specification the analyses of 
the fast fracture of the steam generators and the pressuriser. Steam generators supplied by the 
manufacturer have also been installed on operating French nuclear power plant units and the 
plant supplier will continue to investigate the temperature effects of stress relief annealing. 
The results of the further investigations are also important in terms of the use of Olkiluoto 
3’s steam generators and pressuriser. When approving the deviation report, STUK also 
required TVO to monitor, assess and utilise further research projects.  At the end of 2020, TVO 
submitted to STUK a further research programme regarding this matter, but STUK’s processing 
of the matter is still underway. The monitoring of the programme will be continued, but the 
matter is not an obstacle to fuel loading.
In 2020, STUK processed deviations that had emerged in the operations of material 
manufacturer Aubert & Duval as well as the reports on their impact on material deliveries 
relating to Olkiluoto 3. The manufacturer’s suspicious operations have attracted wide 
international attention as they have led to a serious helicopter accident. The plant supplier 
has carried out extensive investigations on the manufacturer’s activities. TVO has assessed the 
manufacturer’s deliveries to Olkiluoto 3 in detail based on the plant supplier’s reports and its 
own inspection visits. TVO has concluded that the deviations have no impact on the safety and 
usability of Olkiluoto 3’s components. STUK assessed the reports and approved them at the end 
of 2020. However, in its decision, STUK required TVO to monitor the components made of the 
materials in question in accordance with the condition monitoring procedures.
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2.3.3 Oversight of commissioning 
The purpose of trial operation is to verify that the plant’s systems, structures and components 
operate as planned and have been successfully installed. Large-scale trial operations at the 
Olkiluoto 3 plant unit began already in 2016 when mainly individual components and systems 
were tested. In 2018, the so-called hot functional tests were performed at the plant in which 
main coolant pumps were used to heat the reactor plant and turbine plant systems to the 
correct operating temperature and pressure. During hot functional tests, STUK inspected 
matters relating to the performance of the tests, such as the administration of commissioning 
activities in the control room, the meeting of prerequisites for starting the tests to be 
performed, the orientation of the personnel and the work permit practices relating to the tests. 
As part of the inspection, STUK oversaw the performance of the most significant tests.
STUK had previously approved the results of the heat tests in other respects, but the final 
results of the vibration measurements of the reactor internals were not submitted until 2020. 
These results are of great significance as the structure of the reactor internals is different from 
those of the old reactors, for example, in terms of the reactor’s massive size and heavy reflector 
design. STUK approved the updated result report. Some tests have been postponed or they will 
be repeated during nuclear commissioning phase. 
The biggest open issue in the hot tests was related to the higher than expected vibration 
of the pressuriser surge line belonging to the reactor cooling circuit. The root cause of the 
vibration of the pressuriser surge line has been investigated extensively. The vibrations are 
likely to be caused by excitations caused by turbulent currents in the primary circuit, which 
are close to the structural natural frequencies of the pressuriser connecting line. In order to 
reduce the vibrations, viscose dampers were installed in the pressuriser connecting line. The 
installations were completed in 2020. The verification of the vibration levels will continue after 
fuel loading in connection with the hot functional tests performed before the first criticality, 
at which point the vibration levels of the connecting line will be measured in various 
operational states of the plant.
STUK processed applications related to the open requirements of the pressuriser surge 
line. In connection with the processing, STUK required a clarification regarding the initial 
assumptions of strength analyses. TVO must submit clarification regarding the matter as well 
as the necessary analysis updates to STUK before fuel loading.
Although the plant systems’ joint functional tests had already been performed in 2018, 
a significant number of individual system test runs were still carried out in 2020. All of the 
plant’s systems were not needed in the hot functional tests, and some of the tests of these 
systems had been postponed to take place after the hot functional tests. Examples of these 
systems are standalone systems relating to waste management, some of the ventilation 
systems and the emergency diesel generators. Changes made to previously tested systems were 
also retested.
Commissioning inspections performed to verify the readiness for operation of various 
systems, equipment and buildings were continued in 2020. STUK evaluates the readiness for 
operation of the systems and equipment in connection with the commissioning inspections. 
During commissioning, the equipment are maintained to ensure their operational condition 
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and to evaluate the implementation of necessary maintenance measures. STUK verified the 
implementation of maintenance of the equipment most important to safety during 2020.
During the year, STUK reviewed several changes made to the test programmes. Some of 
the changes had been made on the basis of experience from other EPR units, but most of 
the changes were updates that corrected the test programme to reflect the actual test. In its 
reviews, STUK pays particular attention to having all safety-significant functions tested and to 
having appropriate acceptance criteria for the tests. The test programmes have been of good 
quality, and STUK has approved almost all of them without any requirements. Reports of the 
trial operation results were submitted to STUK throughout the year. The result reports have 
been mainly comprehensive, and STUK made no remarks concerning them. 
2.3.4 Oversight of preparation for operation 
In addition to the technical readiness of the plant, a prerequisite for safe operation of the plant 
is the organisation’s ability to use the plant in a safe manner. This includes ensuring that the 
organisation has sufficient resources and the necessary skills and competence, activities are 
instructed and there are arrangements and procedures for managing different types of matters 
(such as emergency response arrangements, security arrangements, nuclear safeguards and 
maintenance operations). STUK made several inspections relating to the preparation for the 
operation of the plant unit. For example, STUK reviewed safety arrangements, spare parts 
management, emergency response operations, resource planning, the readiness of the plant’s 
operating procedures and instructions related to severe accident management, as well as 
the readiness of the management system and the control room. When the operations to be 
inspected concerned the entire TVO and all of the plant units, the inspection was included 
in the periodic inspection programme of the plant units in operation. Summaries of the 
inspections included in the inspection programme for 2020 are presented in Appendix 4. In 
its inspections and other control activities, STUK paid attention to the clarification of the 
procedures of control room activities, the compliance with instructions, the functioning of 
work permit practices and the clarity of the division of responsibilities between organisations. 
In spring 2020, STUK supervised the required additional demonstrations of the 
functionality of the control room entity with a training simulator. By means of these 
additional demonstrations, TVO sought complementary evidence that the control room 
entity contributes to the safe operation of the plant. The control room entity consists of the 
competence and operating practices of the control room operators, the plant’s operating 
procedure, including transient and emergency procedures, the control room interfaces and the 
physical control room environment. The additional demonstrations were concluded in May 
and the report on the matter was finalised at STUK in the autumn, and STUK found no cause 
for remarks on the matter.
According to Section 7 i (2) of the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987), only a person approved by 
the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) for the position in question may act as a 
nuclear facility operator in the control room of the facility. STUK approved the first operators 
of Olkiluoto 3 in accordance with TVO’s applications already at the end of 2018. However, 
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these first approvals were only valid for up to two years. Therefore, at the end of 2020, STUK 
supervised the updating of the licences and approved the related applications.
STUK’s monitoring has not revealed any specific shortcomings in terms of TVO’s 
competence or resources. Olkiluoto 3 has new employees especially in maintenance and 
operation tasks. For their part, training and on-the-job learning are still ongoing. However, 
TVO has taken measures, such as hired consultants and arranged for the technical unit staff to 
support the new employees.
STUK has monitored TVO’s provisions for the COVID-19 pandemic and has assessed 
TVO’s operational possibilities on the plant site. No concerns emerged in the course of the 
monitoring, for example, regarding foreign labour.
The management system of Olkiluoto 3 is a part of TVO’s management system. In the 
autumn inspection, the OL3 management system was found to be incomplete with regard 
to some of the plant management instructions and related training. Their readiness will be 
verified during a review in early 2021 to confirm TVO’s readiness for fuel loading. 
Organisational changes at Olkiluoto 3 aimed at strengthening TVO’s role at the plant 
instead of the plant supplier have continued. TVO and the plant supplier have been working 
in so-called joint organisations, which enable TVO to better participate in the finalisation and 
commissioning of the plant.
The readiness inspection of Olkiluoto 3’s control room thoroughly reviewed the operating 
personnel’s procedures in relation to their readiness for fuel loading. STUK conducted remote 
interviews and an online survey for operators and field operators. Based on the inspection, it 
can be stated that the safety culture in TVO’s operations appears to be at a good level.
2.3.5 Nuclear safeguards
STUK granted TVO three licences concerning the use of nuclear commodities at the Olkiluoto 
3 plant unit (Appendix 7). In December, TVO submitted to the European Commission the 
updated Basic Technical Characteristics (BTC) of the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit. TVO submitted 
the nuclear safeguards reports and notifications regarding Olkiluoto 3 it was responsible for in 
time, and they were consistent with the observations made during the inspections.
In 2020, STUK carried out two inspections related to nuclear commodities for Olkiluoto 3. 
No cause for remarks was found in the inspections. The oversight and inspections by STUK 
indicated that TVO fulfilled its nuclear safeguard obligations at Olkiluoto 3 in 2020.
2.4 Hanhikivi 1 
In 2020, STUK did not yet have at its disposal comprehensive information on the plant and 
system design of Fennovoima’s Hanhikivi nuclear power plant for the detailed assessment of 
the plant design and the analyses made and for the preparation of the safety assessment. 
For the decision in principle, STUK made a preliminary safety assessment in 2014. In the 
suitability assessment of the AES-2006 plant alternative of the Preliminary Safety Analysis 
Report STUK presented that the AES-2006 plant alternative can meet the Finnish nuclear and 
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radiation safety requirements via design changes, additional analyses and qualification. During 
the construction licence process, the plant supplier has continued to change the basic design 
of the facility in order to meet the Finnish safety requirements. To implement the changes in 
basic design, the plant designers need advanced design systems to manage the requirements 
set for the facility and organisation and to maintain design integrity, among other things, 
through the procedures and tools of configuration management.
A key document for the processing of the safety case in the construction licence phase is 
the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (PSAR) of the facility. In order to prepare the safety 
analysis report, the plant supplier and lead designer have set up a separate project (PSAR 
Localisation Project, PLP) to produce a safety analysis report that would meet the Finnish 
requirements. The PLP project has acquired extensive nuclear and radiation safety expertise 
from Russia, Finland and other European countries. The aim is to submit the safety report 
to STUK in 15 delivery batches. The parts of the report submitted to STUK thus far are based 
on the first stage of the plant’s basic design and have not fully corresponded to the maturity 
required of PSAR under the Finnish requirements for the construction licence stage. The parts 
of the safety report will be further updated and completed later on at stage 2. STUK has issued 
clarification requests for all the delivery batches it has processed. 
Fennovoima submitted the first delivery batch of the first stage of the preliminary safety 
report produced by the PLP project to STUK at the beginning of December 2019, and during 
2020, Fennovoima submitted delivery batches 2, 3, 4, 5 and 11. Fennovoima plans to supplement 
the preliminary safety report based on STUK’s feedback and as the design progresses to stage 2 
in 2021.
As a part of delivery batch 2 in April, Fennovoima submitted to STUK the preliminary safety 
report chapters describing the site and safety classification. Based on its review, STUK issued 
a clarification request in July. In the clarification request regarding the plant site, the main 
supplementary needs are related to the descriptions of the security arrangements and the 
precautionary action zone in the preliminary safety report. The description of the water areas 
surrounding the power plant, its aquatic populations and the impact of the warming of the 
water caused by condensing water and climate change must also be specified. Regarding the 
site bedrock, STUK introduced a requirement for a monitoring programme of the movements 
of rock blocks and the issue of action limits for any movements. 
The request for clarification concerning the security classification required that it shall be 
possible to bring the plant into a controlled state specified in Regulation STUK Y/1/2018 with 
safety class 2 systems and into a safe state specified in the above-mentioned Regulation with 
safety class 3 systems.
During the second tertile, Fennovoima submitted to STUK the third delivery batch of the 
preliminary safety report. The third batch included descriptions of systems implementing 
the transfer of the reactor decay heat. A clarification request based on the processing of 
the chapter on the decay heat removal systems was made in October. The maturity of the 
submitted material was not yet at a sufficient level for the construction licence stage and 
compliance with Finnish requirements could not yet be verified in all respects. 
In October, Fennovoima submitted to STUK for approval seven chapters on safety systems 
implementing the diversity principles (delivery batch 4). The processing of the chapters on 
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safety systems implementing the diversity principle was ongoing at the end of the year. Based 
on the submitted material, STUK is not yet able to assess, among other things, the adequacy of 
the consideration of internal and external threats in plant design.
The preliminary safety report parts concerning the plant’s nuclear waste management 
and systems were also submitted in October (delivery batch 11). At the end of December, 
Fennovoima submitted the parts of the preliminary safety report on drainage systems and 
turbine plant systems, as well as the parts concerning operation and technical specifications 
(delivery batch 5).  The processing of these delivery batches was ongoing at the end of the year.
Discussions with Fennovoima continued on the submission of the plans related to the 
construction licence application in stages and the objectives of various stages in order to form 
a better overall picture. Thus far, the processing of the construction licence data in stages 
has been challenging for STUK, as the submitted data packages do not always form a clear 
independent entity, progressing from the presentation of principles to details. STUK has also 
emphasised to Fennovoima the importance of timely and sufficient consideration of STUK’s 
previous requirements in plant design – the measures taken based on STUK’s requirements and 
the observations of the Government’s decision-in-principle stage have progressed slowly from 
the point of view of STUK’s inspection and safety assessment. Furthermore, there continue 
to be challenges in the management of the technical configuration in the project, which have 
been reflected to STUK as the need to verify, among other things, the correctness of the output 
and result data between different design areas.
In 2020, STUK continued to evaluate the management systems and operations of 
Fennovoima and other organisations involved in the implementation of the project through 
reviews to ensure that their practical operations are in line with what is presented in the 
management systems and meet the requirements. STUK launched the inspections included in 
the regulatory inspection programme (RKT) in September 2015. The inspections are planned 
every six months, and in 2020, STUK carried out eight inspections according to its inspection 
programme. The results of the inspections will be used by STUK when preparing a safety 
assessment and statement on the construction licence application.
Summaries of the inspection programme’s inspections related to the processing of the 
construction licence carried out in 2020 are presented in Appendix 5.
2.4.1 Management systems, quality management and safety culture
Fennovoima was reorganised in the spring of 2019 and is currently developing procedures in 
line with its new management principles. STUK monitored the development of operations 
in the inspections of the inspection programme related to the processing of the construction 
licence. The description of the core processes of Fennovoima’s new organisation for the 
management system was started in 2019 in connection with the reorganisation, and the work 
continued in 2020. STUK monitored the progress of the work in topical meetings and in the 
review of management and inspection procedures. Fennovoima has developed its management 
system, and most of the top-level processes have now been described. In its new operations, 
Fennovoima strives to allocate responsibilities more clearly than before.
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2.4.2 Plant site and technology
During 2020, Fennovoima continued to evaluate the results of the geological surveys and 
compiled summary reports of them. Open issues in the safety assessment of the geological 
surveys by STUK include the observation of the plant site’s brittle deformation zones in 
the establishment of the design bases for the foundations and condition monitoring of the 
buildings and structures significant to safety.
In the autumn, Fennovoima presented to STUK in a meeting in a preliminary manner the 
geological survey reports aiming at justifying the design bases of the foundations and placing 
of the facility at the plant site. STUK has commented on the reports in a preliminary manner 
and is waiting for their official submittal. STUK has made use of the expertise of the geologists 
at the University of Turku to evaluate the results. 
In its meetings regarding mechanical equipment and manufacturing technology with 
Fennovoima and the plant supplier, STUK discussed, among other things, the changes in 
Russian design and manufacturing standards, as well as the content and situation of future 
document deliveries. In 2020, Fennovoima submitted to STUK for processing a report related 
to the verifiability of the reactor pressure vessel for the part of the so-called Long Lead Items 
(LLI), which STUK approved. The requirements specifications of the so-called core catcher 
related to the management of severe reactor accidents were also submitted to STUK for 
processing and their processing is scheduled to be completed in early 2021.
STUK and Fennovoima’s experts on mechanics and manufacturing have discussed the 
updated requirements of the YVL Guides relating to the welding and NDT methods, personnel 
qualifications, reporting requirements for the destructive testing laboratories, new certification 
of the main coolant pump forgings and surface welding and the connection of steel structures 
to concrete structures.
Framatome has been chosen by the plant supplier as the supplier of safety-classified main 
I&C systems. The licensing and phasing of I&C systems have been presented to STUK at 
meetings. No information has yet been provided to STUK on the design and delivery scope of 
Framatome. 
Fennovoima has progressed in the commissioning of weather monitoring systems for 
the plant site. It has been possible to start collecting weather data at the site. In the next 
phase, Fennovoima will set up a connection from the weather monitoring system to the 
Finnish Meteorological Institute. The procurement of fixed environmental radiation dose rate 
measurement stations has also progressed.
STUK has emphasised in topical meetings, review of document deliveries and RKT 
inspections that the radiation doses during the operation of the nuclear power plant can be 
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significantly influenced by both material choices and layout design of the plant, so the early 
phase solutions of system design play a major role. 
As regards the management of safety-related human factors, Fennovoima has determined 
the practices of the supply chain by auditing the supplier in charge of the matter. According 
to the audit, the management of safety-related human factors is not yet as such at the level of 
STUK’s requirements.
2.4.3  Security arrangements
Security arrangements for Hanhikivi 1 and its operating environment have not yet been 
submitted to STUK. 
In February, STUK approved Fennovoima’s application for the processing and storage 
of safety-classified official documents (SC III and SC IV) in a special room in Salmisaari 
designated for the purpose in question.
2.4.4  Nuclear waste management
STUK assesses the safety of the interim storage for spent fuel in two stages: In the first phase, 
Fennovoima submitted to STUK the draft plans of the interim storage for spent fuel as part 
of the construction licence documentation for the nuclear power plant. STUK processed 
the material and provided Fennovoima with information on the supplements needed in the 
construction licence phase at the turn of the year 2018–2019. In the second phase, following 
the granting of the construction licence, Fennovoima will submit to STUK detailed design 
documentation describing the interim storage systems. Fennovoima cannot start building the 
storage until STUK has approved the design documentation. In addition to this, Fennovoima 
will submit to STUK in the construction licence phase reports on the nuclear waste 
management strategy, construction feasibility of the interim storage and site surveys.
2.4.5 Nuclear safeguards
Fennovoima submitted the nuclear safeguards reports and notifications it was responsible 
for in time. At this stage of the project, the nuclear safeguards obligations relate to the 
import, receipt, handing over for processing and export of licensed nuclear information. The 
subcontractors of Fennovoima and plant supplier Rosatom must also obtain the necessary 
licences for information processing.
In 2020, Fennovoima applied for approval of the nuclear safeguards manual and the person 
in charge of nuclear safeguards. These matters continue to be processed by STUK.
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STUK issued a statement to the Ministry of Employment and the Economy (MEAE) on 2 April 
2019 on the operating licence application submitted by VTT Technical Research Centre of 
Finland in June 2017. In STUK’s view, VTT meets the requirements of the Nuclear Energy Act 
(990/1987) with regard to the permanent shutdown state of the research reactor. The safety 
of the decommissioning phase has also been adequately demonstrated for the purpose of 
granting the licence, but detailed plans for the dismantling phase of the research reactor need 
to be further specified before the dismantling of the reactor is started. VTT must, among other 
things, submit the Final Safety Analysis Report regarding the decommissioning phase to STUK 
for approval before the start of the dismantling phase. In STUK’s view, VTT’s plans regarding 
nuclear waste management of the decommissioning process were not sufficiently complete and 
detailed to ensure the safe and smooth treatment, storage and final disposal of the generated 
nuclear waste. In addition, the security arrangements of the research reactor need to be 
developed to meet changing needs, conditions and threat assessments. According to current 
knowledge, the Government will continue to process VTT’s operating licence application in 
2021.
In June 2020, VTT submitted a waste management scheme for the research reactor and in 
September 2020 a nuclear waste management plan to MEAE, which requested STUK to provide 
a statement on the documents. Regarding the waste management scheme, STUK concluded 
that the agreement VTT and Fortum signed on nuclear waste management and disassembly of 
the reactor in spring 2020 has significantly reduced the risks previously associated with VTT’s 
financial preparation. Furthermore, the preparation plan took into account both the return 
of spent fuel to the United States and potential interim storage at the Loviisa power plant. 
Uncertainty regarding the timing of costs remained in the waste management plan, as the 
schedule for returning the spent fuel to the US was not known. However, STUK considered the 
cost and price information provided by VTT to be acceptable. 
Regarding the nuclear waste management plan, STUK concluded that VTT has made 
significant progress in planning its nuclear waste management measures. The agreement 
between VTT and Fortum on the implementation of decommissioning and the organisation of 
nuclear waste management significantly reduced uncertainties related to the implementation 
of nuclear waste management measures and schedules. According to the nuclear waste 
management plan, the dismantling of the FiR 1 research reactor will start in autumn 2022 and 
be completed by the end of 2023. In its nuclear waste management plan, VTT presented two 
options for the management of spent fuel: return to the United States and interim storage at 
the Loviisa power plant. In its statement, STUK concluded that the date of returning the spent 
fuel to the United States is no longer as critical for the commencement of the dismantling of 
the reactor, as the agreement between VTT and Fortum includes the possibility of storing the 
spent fuel of the FiR 1 research reactor at the Loviisa power plant.
Inspections in accordance with the periodic inspection programme have been continued 
at the research reactor. The inspection activities will continue in the current scope until the 
dismantling of the research reactor begins. STUK has prepared a separate inspection plan for 
the dismantling phase. In addition, STUK has completed the processing of licences enabling 
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the transport of spent fuel to the United States and the review of the documents related to the 
planning of the transport. The transport of the spent nuclear fuel from the research reactor to 
the United States was carried out at the end of December 2020.
Concerning nuclear safeguards, the material balance area of VTT’s research reactor includes 
nuclear materials in the Otakaari 3 building and their related activities. VTT’s site, which is 
compliant with the Additional Protocol of the Safeguards Agreement, includes the buildings 
in the material balance areas of both the research reactor and the Centre for Nuclear Safety. 
In 2020, STUK carried out one nuclear safeguards inspection on the material balance area of 
the research reactor. The oversight and inspections by STUK indicated that VTT fulfilled its 
nuclear safeguards obligations in 2020.
2.6 Spent nuclear fuel encapsulation and disposal facility
In 2020, Posiva continued the construction of nuclear facilities. The excavation of the central 
tunnel, shafts and canister reception area continued at the disposal facility. The construction 
of the encapsulation plant progressed and the first safety-classified structures were completed 
during the year.
The regulatory oversight during the construction stage of the nuclear fuel encapsulation 
and disposal facility covers the design, manufacture, construction and installation of the 
nuclear waste facility and its safety-classified systems, structures and components, as well as 
demonstrating long-term safety. At a later stage, the oversight will also target commissioning, 
at which time STUK will oversee Posiva’s operations during commissioning, review test plans 
and test results, and perform commissioning inspections of components, structures and 
systems.
2.6.1 Construction of the disposal facility
In the excavation of the disposal facility, Posiva continued excavating the central tunnels. In 
addition, during 2020, Posiva excavated shafts and the canister reception area. During 2020, 
Posiva submitted to STUK for processing rock engineering plans concerning the disposal area’s 
central tunnel and disposal tunnels. STUK carried out rock construction inspections in the 
completed tunnels.
During 2020, Posiva had challenges in producing rock engineering planning materials of 
sufficient quality. Related requirements have been presented in STUK’s decisions regarding the 
materials, and Posiva is carrying out development measures to correct the shortcomings.
2.6.2  Construction of the encapsulation plant
Posiva began the construction of the encapsulation plant in summer 2019. In 2020, the 
construction of the encapsulation plant proceeded as planned. Construction and fire 
engineering documents regarding the encapsulation plant were processed at STUK. All 
structural data regarding the encapsulation plant was reviewed during 2020. Inspections 
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related to the construction of the encapsulation plant at the construction site were transferred 
to an inspection organisation. 
A large number of construction plans for hoisting and transfer equipment were submitted 
to STUK in 2020. The inspection organisation is also used to help inspect these documents in 
order to balance the review workload.
2.6.3 Oversight of requirements set at the construction 
licence phase and Posiva’s development work 
During the construction licence application review, STUK set requirements on Posiva that 
must be taken into account during the construction or before submitting the operating licence 
application. STUK has systematically monitored compliance with the requirements set based 
on the construction licence application review and Posiva’s plans to ensure compliance with 
the requirements. 
Posiva has taken into account the requirements set by STUK during the construction 
licence review in the system design. According to the schedule it has produced, Posiva has 
submitted system design documents to STUK for review. During 2020, STUK has processed a 
wide range of system documents from various fields including, for example, design documents 
on rock caverns, engineered barriers, radiation measurements, hoisting and transfer equipment 
and I&C systems.
Posiva has ongoing projects for demonstrating long-term safety and for the designing and 
development of engineered barriers. STUK has monitored the progress of the projects, and they 
have been discussed at meetings with Posiva. With its oversight, STUK ensures that the project 
plans and programmes have sufficiently taken into account the requirements set by STUK in 
connection with the construction licence review.
2.6.4 Organisational operations and quality management 
STUK has overseen the activities of Posiva’s organisation in inspections included in the 
construction inspection programme. The inspections assessed Posiva’s nuclear facilities’ 
preparation for production, monitoring programme, security arrangements, design activities, 
procurement and product control, as well as nuclear safeguards. Inspections under the 
construction inspection programme are covered in further detail in Appendix 6.
The inspections carried out under the construction inspection programme have covered 
the activities of the organisation. Human resources monitoring has shown that resourcing 
procedures have been improved and competence has been built for example in areas such as 
Human Factors Engineering (HFE) and radiation measurement.
In 2020, the monitoring of the management system focused on the design documentation 
review procedures at Posiva. Posiva has previously had challenges in producing high-quality 
rock engineering design documentation for STUK. The procedures and compliance with them 
have been covered, among other things, by means of a procurement and product control 
inspection falling under the management system inspection. The inspection showed that 
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Posiva is currently taking measures that have the potential to improve the quality of the design 
documentation submitted to STUK.
STUK has continued to supervise Posiva’s auditing activities. Due to the COVID-19 
pandemic, the auditing activity has been smaller than in previous years, but Posiva has been 
able to continue some of its activities.
2.6.5 Preparations for the operating licence phase 
Posiva has submitted operating licence application documents to STUK in advance for 
comments This was done to streamline the processing of the actual operating licence 
application documents. During 2020, Posiva submitted to STUK for pre-review chapters of the 
final safety analysis report, topical reports and reports on the safety case of long-term safety. 
STUK compiles comments on the documentation for Posiva to be taken into account when 
preparing the actual operating licence application documentation.
2.6.6 Nuclear safeguards
STUK implemented nuclear safeguards for the final disposal in compliance with the national 
regulatory plan. STUK inspected the site which was reported by Posiva to be compliant with 
the Additional Protocol of the Safeguards Agreement and the construction activities in two 
periodic inspections of nuclear safeguards. 
STUK granted Posiva an import licence for fuel element models and fuel channels and, 
in connection with the preparations for the operating licence phase, commented on Posiva’s 
clarification of the arrangement of the necessary safeguards to prevent the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons. 
Posiva submitted the nuclear safeguards reports and notifications it was responsible for in 
good time. The oversight and inspections by STUK indicated that Posiva fulfilled its nuclear 
safeguards obligations in 2020. STUK carried out one nuclear safeguards inspection under 
the construction inspection programme, which was focused on Posiva’s nuclear materials 
accountancy currently under preparation. Five requirements were issued during the inspection 
concerning Posiva’s future operations, as the majority of nuclear safeguards reporting 
obligations only apply to Posiva once the plant is in possession of nuclear materials.
STUK further intensified its cooperation with the IAEA and the European Commission 
aimed at ensuring that the plans on arranging the international nuclear safeguards for the 
encapsulation plant and disposal facility will proceed in line with the design of the facility 
and also meet national requirements. During 2020, 7 technical discussions and 3 technical 
meetings were held with Posiva, the European Commission and the IAEA as well as one 
executive level meeting between STUK and the IAEA on the oversight arrangements of the 
encapsulation plant and the disposal facility. Almost all meetings, with the exception of the 
executive meeting, took place as remote meetings. The IAEA and the European Commission’s 
surveillance and monitoring equipment plan for the encapsulation plant is finished with the 
exception of the last few details and is now included in Posiva’s plant design. The IAEA and the 
Commission have also presented a draft of the surveillance and monitoring equipment plan 
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for the final disposal facility, the practical implementation of which is still under discussion. 
At the end of 2020, directors from the IAEA’s nuclear safeguards department visited Olkiluoto 
to familiarise themselves with the facilities under construction at the encapsulation plant and 
disposal facility.
The Safeguards projects of final disposal in Finland and Sweden are coordinated on the 
EPGR forum of the IAEA, the European Commission, the Swedish and Finnish authorities (SSM 
and STUK) and the operators (SKB and Posiva). The EPGR forum convened once during the 
year. 
Nuclear fuel placed in final disposal can no longer be inspected or verified by any 
known means. Therefore, it is important for nuclear safeguards that fuel be verified before 
encapsulation and final disposal and that the verification be documented using such methods 
that leave no doubt as to the accuracy and completeness of the data reported.
STUK’s project to develop the verification methods and equipment for spent nuclear fuel to 
be disposed of progressed well during the year. The project investigates the integration of two 
complementary methods PGET (Passive Gamma Emission Tomography) and PNAR (Passive 
Neutron Albedo Reactivity) into one modular equipment. Measurements were performed 
in Loviisa in June 2020 using PGET and PNAR equipment was used in Olkiluoto in October 
2020. The measurements were successful with both methods. In the case of the PGET method, 
development continued also on the software side. The performance of the analysis algorithm 
was studied in cooperation with the University of Helsinki and VTT. A cooperation project was 
also launched with the IAEA.
2.7 Other operators
Producers of uranium, parties in possession of small amounts of nuclear use items or nuclear 
information subject to a licence, and research facilities participating in research of the nuclear 
fuel cycle are also included in the scope of regulatory nuclear energy oversight. STUK oversees 
that the users of nuclear energy (operators in the field) meet the set requirements, the most 
essential of which are competent organisation and up-to-date internal instructions. In line 
with the respective applications, STUK approves the responsible managers or deputies.
With regard to uranium producers, STUK reviewed the reports and notifications submitted 
by the Kokkola and Harjavalta metal works and the Sastamala ore processing plant. The 
responsible persons for each of these operators remained unchanged and there were no 
significant changes in their operations. In Kokkola, the ownership of Freeport Cobalt Oy was 
transferred to Umicore Oy at the end of 2019, so in 2020, STUK reviewed the nuclear safeguards 
manual of the new operator and carried out an inspection in Kokkola. At the same time, the 
monitoring and reporting procedures of the concentration of uranium in the copper cement at 
Boliden Kokkola Oy’s zinc factory were inspected. 
All operators submitted the nuclear safeguards reports and notifications required from 
them. The Commission postponed and subsequently revoked its own nuclear safeguards and 
material balance area inspections due to travel restrictions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.  
Of these operators reporting to the Commission, STUK inspected the nuclear material 
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inventory of the University of Helsinki remotely with only one representative of the operator 
present in the laboratory. As a result of the inspection, the reporting practices for small 
batches of nuclear material were specified. In 2020, the University of Jyväskylä ( JYFL) applied 
for the approval of a new responsible manager. STUK interviewed the candidate remotely 
before approving the candidate. In October, the IAEA and the Commission, together with 
STUK’s safeguards section, verified the compliance and accounting of the nuclear safeguards 
system related to STUK’s own activities. Several suggestions for improvement were made 
during the inspection. Of the parties in possession of small amounts of nuclear use items, 
DEKRA Industrial Oy and Kiwa Inspecta Oy supplied radiation shields containing depleted 
uranium back to the manufacturers. The parties in possession of small amounts of nuclear use 
items fulfilled their nuclear safeguards obligations and submitted their annual reports on time.
STUK inspected the annual reports on nuclear fuel cycle related research and development 
activities and produced a report on their basis for the IAEA. The IAEA requested a report on 
the equipment manufacturing and autoclaves delivered from Finland in accordance with the 
Additional Protocol, to which STUK responded in cooperation with the equipment supplier.
On the basis of the inspections, as well as the reports and notifications submitted, STUK 
has satisfied itself that operation classified as the use of nuclear energy in Finland has been 
implemented in compliance with the nuclear safeguards obligations.
STUK supervised the trial operations of Terrafame Oy in accordance with the licence 
granted in 2017. As regards nuclear safeguards, Terrafame started regular reporting to STUK 
and the European Commission in summer 2019. The oversight and inspections by STUK 
indicated that Terrafame fulfilled its nuclear safeguards obligations in 2020.
In the autumn of 2017, Terrafame submitted an application to the Finnish Government for 
starting the extraction of uranium in the uranium extraction plant built earlier in the mine 
area. STUK issued a statement about the licence application regarding Terrafame Oy’s mining 
and milling operations on 10 June 2019. STUK found that the conditions for the granting of a 
licence under Articles 5 to 7 and Article 21 of the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987) were fulfilled 
in view of its line of business, but that Terrafame would have to supplement the safety analysis 
report submitted in connection with the application before it could launch operations. The 
Government granted Terrafame licence on 6 February 2020. In addition, in spring 2020, STUK 
approved Terrafame’s manager responsible for uranium extraction and his deputy. One of 
the candidates was interviewed remotely by video connection and the other was interviewed 
as a normal interview before the issue of COVID-19 restrictions. The licence to commence 
operations includes conditions relating to nuclear safety and potential nuclear waste. 
According to these conditions, Terrafame has to update its report on the decommissioning of 
its uranium recovery plant on based on operational and maintenance experience from the first 
three years, monitor the accumulation of plant waste at the uranium recovery plant and the 
implementation of waste management, and to report the results to the Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority annually. The company must also update its waste management reports 
based on the experience gained during the first three years of operation, carry out a periodic 
safety assessment of uranium recovery in accordance with the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987) 
every 15 years, and supplement the documents submitted to the Radiation and Nuclear Safety 
Authority well in advance before launch of operations. In March 2020, appeals against the 
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granted licence were filed at the Supreme Administrative Court. The operation can only be 
started once the licence is valid and STUK has carried out a safety inspection covering the 
entire uranium production activity on the site. The amount of semi-finished uranium produced 
is estimated to be no more than 250 tonnes of uranium per year.
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3 Safety research
Publicly funded safety research on the use of nuclear energy has a key role in the development 
and maintenance of nuclear technology expertise in Finland. 2020 was the second year of 
operation of the new four-year research programmes SAFIR2022 and KYT2022. The planned 
research projects were carried out successfully and the short-term effects of the COVID-19 
pandemic on research and international research cooperation have not been significant.
Without safety research programmes like SAFIR and KYT, developing the expertise needed 
in the nuclear sector to support the authorities in ensuring safety would not be possible in 
Finland. According to the Nuclear Energy Act (990/ 1987), research funded by the Finnish State 
Nuclear Waste Management Fund (VYR) aims at ensuring that the authorities have access 
to comprehensive nuclear expertise. Both STUK and the licensees have hired several people 
who have obtained their training for expert positions in the field of nuclear energy use and 
oversight in publicly funded research programmes. The safety research programmes also have 
an important role in the training of organisations that provide STUK with technical support 
services, such as the VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland, the University of Helsinki, the 
Aalto University, the Finnish Meteorological Institute, the Geological Survey of Finland and 
Lappeenranta-Lahti University of Technology (LUT University).
The SAFIR2022 safety research programme consists of 36 projects that were selected in the 
autumn of 2019 based on a competitive bidding. The available VYR funding for the research 
was around EUR 4.2 million. The volume of the SAFIR2022 safety research programme 
is around EUR 6.4 million and approximately 42.4 research years. As shown in Figure 7, 
the programme is divided into four research areas of the programme: 1) overall safety and 
management of design, 2) reactor safety, 3) structural integrity and materials, and 4) research 
infrastructure. The VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland and LUT University will use 
around 16% of the entire public funding for safety research when reforming the national 
infrastructure. This mainly covers the work related to the acquisition and commissioning 
of infrastructure-related investment objects. VYR finances equipment investments from a 
separate research-related funding portion aimed at the renewal of hot chambers at the VTT 
Centre for Nuclear Safety and the thermohydraulic test equipment of LUT University. In 
2020, the funding was channelled to VTT in the manner required by the Nuclear Energy Act 
(990/1987), and it amounted to EUR 2.74 million. The research programme covers all issues 
integral to nuclear safety, and it will establish and maintain the expertise, analysis methods 
and experimental readiness to resolve any unforeseen safety issues.
The SAFIR2022 research projects are controlled by eight steering groups in addition to the 
four research areas. The steering groups take care of the academic control of research. Members 
of the supporting groups were appointed from organisations relating to the research of the 
use of nuclear energy. The support groups are: 1) overall safety and organisation, 2) plant level 
analyses, 3) reactor and fuel, 4) thermal hydraulics, 5) mechanical integrity, 6) structures and 
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materials, 7) severe accidents, and 8) research infrastructure. The projects for the support 
groups were assigned based on the research areas. All of the projects included in one support 
group are usually part of a single research area.
The projects included in the SAFIR2022 programme for 2020 meet the requirements set 
for VYR-funded research. The research programme has a special focus on the development of 
high-quality infrastructure. The project launched in 2018, making use of new infrastructure, 
continued in cooperation with Swedish power companies and research organisations. The 
project deals with investigating the radiation embrittlement of the Barsebäck pressure vessel 
using samples taken during the decommissioning of the nuclear power plant. This is an 
excellent opportunity, first, to gain authentic operating experience data on the properties 
of the materials of the pressure vessel and, second, to utilise the new research opportunities 
provided by the VTT Centre for Nuclear Safety.
The SAFIR2022 projects include several projects for developing capabilities, e.g. for avoiding 
situations similar to the one that lead to the accident at the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi 
nuclear power plant in 2011 or understanding the sequence of events in such accidents. The 
projects’ subject matters range from design bases of nuclear facilities and the analysis of 
accidents to the operation of organisations during accidents and as systems comprising several 
organisations. An international research project that started in 2015 has offered as reliable 
information as possible about the course of the TEPCO Fukushima Dai-ichi accident in order to 
create Finnish accident analyses and compare results globally.
In addition to the above, the SAFIR2022 management group may fund small projects aimed 
at helping the development of research projects with new topics into becoming members of 
25% Overall safety and systemic approach to safety
35% Reactor safety
23% Structural safety and materials
16% Research infrastructure
6% Overall safety and organisation
19% Plant level analysis
15% Reactor and fuel
15% Thermal hydraulics
15% Mechanical integrity
8% Structures and materials
6% Severe accidents
16% Research infrastructure
FIGURE 11. Research areas of SAFIR2022 programme and their shares of the total funding in 2020.
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the programme. This procedure has been in use from the beginning of the previous SAFIR2018 
research programme, and it has proven to be an efficient way to promote the creation of high 
standard topical research projects. The 2020 small project was aimed at investigating AI 
applications as support for authority decision-making, machine learning for fault detection, 
advanced seismic methods and cobalt-free hard coatings. 
A new feature in the SAFIR2022 programme is the inclusion of the eight overarching 
topical areas indicating the focus of the programme. The topics highlight, among other things, 
the development of the assessment methods of overall safety, the modernisation of safety 
assessment methods, the long-term use of plants and the requirements set by the changing 
environment for the safe use of nuclear power plants. The topics relating to overall safety 
and the life cycle of fuel are shared with the KYT2022 programme, and the aim is to make the 
cooperation between the programmes even closer.
The four-year KYT2022 research programme was launched in 2018. The research projects 
planned for 2020 were carried out successfully and the short-term effects of the COVID-19 
pandemic on research and international research cooperation were not significant. The 
research topics consist of the assessment of overall safety, the management of spent nuclear 
fuel, power plant waste, decommissioning waste and other radioactive waste, the feasibility 
of nuclear waste management and social research. The topics relating to overall safety and 
the life cycle of fuel are shared with the SAFIR2022 programme, and the aim is to make the 
cooperation between the programmes even closer. The programme consisted of research 
areas which are important for national expertise. It is aimed at extensive coordinated 
multidisciplinary research projects, particularly regarding the research areas related to the 
bedrock, the performance of buffer and backfilling materials and the long-term durability 
of final disposal canisters as well as microbiology. Research infrastructure funding was also 
continued in the KYT2022 programme.
37 research funding applications were submitted in the first part of the call for projects. The 
funding applied for had to be reduced by cutting project funding and leaving some projects 





Overall safety and systemic 





RG1 RG2 RG3 … … RGN
SAFIR2022 Reference Groups
FIGURE 12. The administrative structure of SAFIR2022 research programme.
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The research programme’s framework programme highlights interdisciplinary research 
on the interaction of barriers, which has brought to the funding application, for example, 
a coordinated project investigating the interaction between rock and bentonite. While the 
framework programme called for research related to overall safety, no funding was applied for 
research on the topic in this call for projects.
Only one research project related to social science was included in the call for projects. 
The decision was made to present funding for this project, albeit in cut form. Social science 
research is important in terms of investigating the acceptability of the disposal of nuclear 
waste.
The research programme projects are not aimed at nuclear waste management development 
tasks or licensing required by law of individual licensees, but can be utilised and applied in 
nuclear waste management in a broader sense.
The KYT2022 management team provided funding recommendations to MEAE using 
assessments by the support groups based on the applicability and content of the subject 
matter. In 2020, the funding of the KYT2018 programme from the National Nuclear Waste 
Management Fund (VYR) was approximately EUR 1.9 million. In 2020, the research programme 
funded 30 research projects. The six excellence projects selected for 2019 received funding for 
2020 as per the application. Additional cuts were made to most projects, but these were mostly 
minor. The cuts were made so that the projects receiving funding are better able to carry out 
high-quality research than in the previous KYT programmes.
6% Basic factors in safety
28% Buer, backfill and canister
16% Interactions between barriers
9% Bedrock research
17% Other safety relevant research
17% Low and intermediate waste management
4% Alternative techonolgies in nuclear waste management
4% Social science studies related to nuclear waste management
FIGURE 13. Distribution of VYR funding by research area in 2020.
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4 Oversight of nuclear 
facilities in figures
4.1 Processing of matters
A total 3,514 matters were submitted to STUK for processing in 2020. Of these, 1,195 concerned 
the nuclear power plant under construction and 262 concerned the disposal facility for spent 
nuclear fuel. The review process of a total of 3,344 matters was completed, including matters 
submitted in 2020, those submitted earlier and licences granted by STUK by virtue of the 
Nuclear Energy Act, which are listed in Appendix 7. The average matter review time was 56 






























FIGURE 14. Average review time of opened and closed matters.
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Figures 15–18 illustrate the review time distribution among matters from the various plant 
units and matters about Posiva. 
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FIGURE 15. Distribution of time spent on 
preparing decisions on the Loviisa plant.
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FIGURE 16. Distribution of time spent on preparing 
decisions on the operating plant units of Olkiluoto.








2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
FIGURE 17. Distribution of time spent on 
preparing decisions on Olkiluoto plant unit 3.
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FIGURE 18. Distribution of time spent on 
preparing decisions on Posiva.
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4.2 Inspections at nuclear facility sites and suppliers’ premises
Inspection programmes
A total of 16 inspections at the Loviisa plant and 15 inspections at the Olkiluoto plant were 
carried out under the 2020 periodic inspection programme (Appendix 3). STUK carried 
out 8 readiness inspections at Olkiluoto 3 and 7 inspections under the periodic inspection 
programme of Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2 that also included Olkiluoto 3 (Appendix 3). 
There were 8 inspections pertaining to the processing of Fennovoima’s construction licence 
application (Appendix 5). 6 inspections of the encapsulation plant and disposal facility 
construction inspection programme were carried out in 2020 (Appendix 6). The key findings of 
the inspections are presented in the appendices and the chapters on regulatory oversight.
Other inspections at plant sites
A total of 2,304 inspection protocols were signed on site or on the suppliers’ premises in 
2020 (other than the above-mentioned inspection programme inspections and the nuclear 
safeguards inspections, which are separately described). Of these inspections, 1,263 were part of 
the oversight of Olkiluoto 3 and 1,031 of the operating plants. The oversight of the construction 
of Posiva’s final disposal facility included 9 inspections. In addition, tunnel inspections of 
Posiva’s encapsulation plant were carried out.



















FIGURE 19. Number of inspection days onsite and at component manufacturers’ premises.
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4.3 Finances and resources
The duty area of regulatory oversight of safety in the use of nuclear energy includes basic 
operations subject to a charge as well as those free of charge. Basic operations subject to a 
charge mainly consist of the regulatory oversight of nuclear facilities, the costs of which are 
charged to those subject to the oversight. Basic operations free of charge include international 
and domestic cooperation as well as emergency response operations and communications. 
Basic operations free of charge are publicly funded. Overheads arising from the preparation 
of regulations and support functions (e.g. administration, development projects in support of 
regulatory activities, competence development, reporting, and participation in nuclear safety 
research) are carried over into the costs of basic operation subject to charge and free of charge 
and contracted services in relation to the number of working hours spent on each function.
Consequently, the cost correlation of regulatory oversight of nuclear safety was 100%. 
Attainment of the cost price for the oversight is ensured by adjusting the invoicing with a 
balancing bill to correspond to actual costs after annual cost accounting. The income and costs 
of regulatory oversight of nuclear safety subject to a charge were EUR 19.6 million. The figure 
includes the radiation monitoring in the immediate vicinity of nuclear facilities that was 
changed from a service operation to regulatory oversight in 2015. The total costs of regulatory 
oversight of nuclear safety were EUR 21.6 million. This figure includes the costs of regulatory 
oversight of nuclear safety subject to charge as well as free of charge. The share of activities 
subject to a charge accounted for 91% of the total costs. Figure 20 shows the annual costs of 
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19.6 22.1 18.0 20.1 17.8 20.7 18.4 21.4 19.6 21.6
FIGURE 20. Income and costs of nuclear safety regulation.
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The time spent on the inspection and review of the Loviisa nuclear power plant was 17.3 
man-years or 11.5% of the total working time of the nuclear safety regulatory personnel. The 
time spent on the inspection and review of the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant’s operating 
units was 16.2 man-years or 10.8% of the total working time. In addition to the monitoring 
of the operation of the nuclear power plants, these figures include the nuclear safeguards. 
The time spent on the inspection and review of Olkiluoto 3 was 22.2 man-years or 14.7% of 
the total working time. Work related to the Fennovoima plant project amounted to 9 man-
years or 6% of the total working time. A total of 10.4 man-years or 6.9% of the total working 
time was spent on the inspection and review of Posiva’s operations, and the time spent on 
the inspection and review of the FiR 1 research reactor was 0.7 man-years. Figure 21 shows the 
division of working time of the personnel engaged in nuclear safety oversight (in man-years) 
by subject of oversight during 2013–2020 The time spent on the inspection and review of the 
Loviisa nuclear power plant was 17.3 man-years or 11.5% of the total working time of the nuclear 
safety regulatory personnel. The time spent on the inspection and review of the Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plant’s operating units was 16.2 man-years or 10.8% of the total working time. In 
addition to the monitoring of the operation of the nuclear power plants, these figures include 
the nuclear safeguards. The time spent on the inspection and review of Olkiluoto 3 was 22.2 
man-years or 14.7% of the total working time. Work related to the Fennovoima plant project 
amounted to 9 man-years or 6% of the total working time. A total of 10.4 man-years or 6.9% of 
the total working time was spent on the inspection and review of Posiva’s operations, and the 
time spent on the inspection and review of the FiR 1 research reactor was 0.7 man-years. Figure 
21 shows the division of working time of the personnel engaged in nuclear safety oversight (in 
man-years) by subject of oversight during 2013–2020.  
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FIGURE 21. Distribution of working time (person-years) of the regulatory personnel by subject of oversight in 2013–2020.
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Where necessary, STUK commissions independent assessments and analyses in support 
of its oversight. Figure 22 illustrates procurement costs in 2016–2020.  The procurements in 
2020 were mainly associated with the sensitivity analyses of the sites' seismic design bases, 
Hanhikivi 1 comparison analyses and the plant type’s hydrochemistry assessment as well as the 
safety assessment of Posiva’s spent nuclear fuel disposal project.
Distribution of the annual working time of the nuclear safety regulatory personnel to the 
various duty areas is shown in Table 1. The figures do not include the work for radiation 














Procurements for development 
of regulatory oversight
 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
FIGURE 22. The acquisition costs of assessments and analyses.
Duty area 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Basic operations subject to a charge 74.9 72.0 71.0 68.7 75.8
Basic operations not subject to a charge 4.0 4.0 4.8 6.3 4.0
Service activities 2.1 4.3 3.7 1.1 0.5
Regulation work and support functions 44.5 42.9 44.1 45.2 44.7
Holidays and absences 26.6 26.9 26.3 26.0 23.3
Total 152.1 150.1 149.9 147.4 148.3
TABLE 1. Distribution of working time (person-years) of the regulatory personnel in each duty area.
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5 International cooperation 
Impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on international cooperation
International travel seized in spring 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic and several 
international meetings were cancelled or postponed. However, from late spring onwards, new 
remote meeting procedures were developed to replace travelling. STUK actively participated in 
international meetings held remotely. Remote meetings functioned reasonably well, although 
they were not able to fully replace all interactions at face-to-face meetings. Remote meetings 
can still be utilised in certain situations in the future, even after travelling is possible again.
International conventions
The Convention on Nuclear Safety requires the presentation of a report to be prepared every 
three years on the fulfilment of its obligations. Starting from 1999, Finland has produced 
national reports which are compliant with the Convention on Nuclear Safety every three years. 
The latest report was produced in 2019. The fulfilment and reporting of the obligations of 
the convention will be assessed at an international review meeting between the contracting 
parties. The convention procedure also includes the possibility of asking questions about the 
activities of other countries. STUK evaluates, among other things, reports of our neighbouring 
countries and reports of countries that have engaged in international cooperation with STUK. 
In connection with the 2019 report, approximately 130 questions were posed to Finland, 
and STUK submitted answers to these questions in February 2020. A meeting between the 
contracting parties was scheduled for March 2020 in Vienna, but was cancelled due to the 
COVID-19 pandemic. The meeting will take place in 2023.
The previous review meeting for the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel 
Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management was held in May 2018. In 
2020, STUK coordinated the compilation of a national report required by the Convention, 
which reported on matters related to nuclear waste management in Finland. Because of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, the Nuclear Waste Convention’s organisation meeting was held remotely 
in autumn 2020. The new organisation of the Nuclear Waste Convention decided that, due to 
the circumstances, the 2021 evaluation meeting would be postponed by about a year to summer 
2022.
International cooperation groups
The IAEA continued to develop its safety standards on nuclear safety and security. STUK had 
a representative on the Commission on Safety Standards (CSS) managing the preparation 
of the standards as well as in the committees dealing with the content of the standards, i.e. 
56 STUK-B 267 / MAY 2021
the Nuclear Safety Standards Committee (NUSSC), the Waste Safety Standards Committee 
(WASSC), the Radiation Safety Standards Committee (RASSC), the Transport Safety Standards 
Committee (TRANSSC) and the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee (NSGC). STUK issued 
statements on the IAEA safety standards under preparation. 
The Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD (NEA) coordinates international cooperation in 
the field of safety research in particular. The organisation also provides an opportunity for 
cooperation between regulatory authorities. STUK was represented in all main committees of 
the organisation dealing with radiation and nuclear safety issues. The main committees’ fields 
of activity are the following:
• nuclear safety regulation (CNRA, Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities),
• safety research (CSNI, Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations),
• radiation safety (CRPPH, Committee on Radiation Protection and Public Health) and
• nuclear waste management (RWMC, Radioactive Waste Management Committee).
The Multinational Design Evaluation Programme (MDEP) involves 15 countries with the 
objective of improving cooperation in the field of the assessment of new nuclear power plants 
and developing convergent regulatory practices. Participants in the programme include only 
those countries with new nuclear power plants at some stage of assessment by the regulatory 
authorities. The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) functions as the secretariat for the 
programme. The MDEP’s work is organised in design-specific working groups. In addition, 
the MDEP has an issue-specific working group, Steering Technical Committee and Policy 
Group. There are five design-specific working groups for the EPR, AP1000, APR1400, VVER 
and HPR1000 plant types. Of these, STUK has participated in the EPR Working Group and the 
VVER Working Group, because an EPR plant is under construction in Olkiluoto (the Olkiluoto 3 
project) and Fennovoima has submitted a construction licence application for the construction 
of a VVER plant in Pyhäjoki (the Hanhikivi 1 project). Finland acts as the chair of the VVER 
Working Group. The only MDEP working group which is independent of plant design deals 
with plant and equipment supplier inspections. 
WENRA’s (Western European Regulator’s Association) Reactor Harmonisation Working 
Group (RHWG) convened three times in 2020, but due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the last two 
meetings were held remotely. During the year, the main tasks of the working group included 
defining the periodic assessment process of reference levels, including the development of the 
criteria for updating needs and recording reference levels, as well as preparation for the Topical 
Peer Review under the Nuclear Safety Directive, where RHWG’s task is to prepare a technical 
content description. STUK actively participated in the work, and was also closely involved in 
RHWG’s subgroups, which processed the need to update the safety objectives set by WENRA 
for new nuclear power plants, the suitability of the safety objectives for small modular reactors 
(SMR) and evaluated the measures to improve safety at the operating plants required by the EU 
Nuclear Safety Directive.
STUK participated in the activities of the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group 
(ENSREG) and three of its subgroups (nuclear safety, nuclear waste management and 
communication). The first Topical Peer Review according to the Nuclear Safety Directive 
updated in 2014 was carried out on ageing management of nuclear power plants in 2017– 2018. 
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In line with the Nuclear Safety Directive, the peer review will be organised every six years in 
the future, and planning the next review has started by collecting experiences from the first 
peer review. In 2020, fire safety was selected as the topic of the second peer review. 
The ENSREG nuclear waste management team prepared reviews on the progress indicators 
of national nuclear waste management and on the reporting of the national waste inventory.  
Reviews on the initial and final decommissioning status of nuclear power plants and 
optimisation of the IRRS and ARTEMIS peer reviews were proposed as topics for the 2021–2023 
programme. The development of nuclear waste management progress indicators will also be 
monitored and practices for radioactive waste generated outside the nuclear sector explored. 
The Deep geological repository regulators forum (DGRRF) is a cooperation forum for 
six nuclear and radiation safety authorities (USA, Canada, Sweden, France, Switzerland 
and Finland) where disposal projects for spent nuclear fuel and high-level nuclear waste 
are discussed from the perspective of public authorities. The workshop planned for 2020 in 
Finland was postponed until 2021. In December 2020, STUK organised a webinar for the group 
on Guide YVL D.7, “Release barriers of spent nuclear fuel disposal facility”, published in 2018. 
Other countries do not have such detailed guidelines on this issue, as their spent nuclear fuel 
and high-level waste disposal projects are not yet that advanced, but the topic will sooner or 
later be relevant to all. 
The VVER Forum is a cooperation group for authorities operating Russian VVER 
pressurized water-type nuclear facilities, mainly concentrating on developing oversight 
activities of plants operating in its member countries. During 2020, STUK participated in the 
working group activities of the VVER forum. The annual meeting of the forum was postponed 
to 2021 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Bilateral cooperation between authorities
Cooperation with the new German Federal Waste Management Authority, Das Bundesamt 
für die Sicherheit der nucleren Entsorgung (BASE), was launched with two webinars, the first 
on waste management and related regulatory control in each country and the second on the 
commissioning and expansion of disposal facilities and acceptance criteria for the waste 
brought into the disposal facility.
STUK started regular cooperation with the French nuclear safety authority, Autorité de 
sûreté nucléaire (ASN) , and its support organisation , Institut de radioprotection et de sûreté 
nucléaire (IRSN) when the Olkiluoto 3 project was launched in the early 2000s. During the 
cooperation, regulatory practices and requirements of the countries involved have been 
compared and challenges and problems pertaining to the EPR plants under construction 
(Olkiluoto 3 and Flamanville 3) have been discussed. In November 2020, STUK held an 
information exchange meeting with ASN and IRSN remotely due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Topical issues regarding observations on the commissioning testing of the different EPR units, 
preparation for plant operation and mechanical components were discussed in the meeting. 
Cooperation with the Russian nuclear safety authority, Rostechnadzor (RTN), was 
significantly reduced compared to previous years due to travel restrictions resulting from 
the COVID-19 pandemic. The 2020 annual programme was settled at the February meeting, 
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but none of the agreed joint inspections were carried out before the cross-border passenger 
traffic was closed. The staff of the Russian authority stayed mostly at home until the summer 
without the opportunity to work remotely. During the autumn, the national restrictions on 
videoconferencing systems were resolved. STUK also meets twice a year with local inspectors 
from RTN’s Leningrad and Kola nuclear power plants, who report on the events in the nearby 
plants during the meetings. One such meeting was held in early 2020 before the COVID-19 
pandemic broke out. Remote connections could not be established with the local inspectors 
and, as a result, the second of the planned two meetings had to be cancelled. 
The Hungarian radiation and nuclear safety authority (HAEA) started the evaluation of 
the construction licence application for the AES-2006 nuclear power plant (PAKS-2 project). 
As the plant type is similar to the one Fennovoima is planning to construct in Hanhikivi, 
STUK continued its close cooperation with HAEA in 2020. The second meeting scheduled 
for 2019 was postponed to January 2020 at the request of HAEA, and the 2020 meetings were 
held remotely due to the COVID-19 pandemic with STUK acting as the meeting organiser. 
Evaluation and inspection findings on issues such as site surveys, plant design and the 
submittal of official licence documents were compared during the meetings. HAEA received 
the PAKS-2 construction licence application at the end of June and started its pre-inspection. 
Hungarian legislation provides a 1.5-year processing period for construction licence permits. 
Cooperation for the prevention of the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons
The Non-Proliferation Treaty entered into force in 1970. Over 190 countries around the world 
are members to the treaty. The NPT Review Conference is held every five years. The previous 
conference was held in 2015, and the next one was scheduled for April–May 2020. Because of 
the COVID-19 pandemic, the meeting was first postponed by six months and then postponed 
again to August 2021. The NPT Preparatory Committee holds sessions prior to the Review 
Conference. 
A group of nuclear supplier countries, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) forms a 
multinational control system whose members are nuclear supplier countries. The group 
aims to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons by controlling the export of materials, 
equipment and technology used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. The group consists of 
48 countries. Finland is represented in the Nuclear Suppliers Group by the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs. STUK usually participates in the meetings of the Technical Experts Group (TEG), which 
are held in April and November. In 2020, both meetings were cancelled. In November, however, 
an information meeting by the chairs’ of the NSG working groups was held as a virtual 
meeting, attended by a STUK expert. 
The Finnish Support Programme to the IAEA Safeguards (FINSP) is funded by the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs and coordinated by STUK. The objective of the support programme is to 
provide support to the IAEA in tasks related to the development of oversight methods, the 
preparation of oversight plans and the training of the IAEA inspectors. The Finnish support 
programme had a review meeting with the IAEA in October 2020. The meeting was held 
remotely. In 2020, the support programme had 14 ongoing projects. 
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STUK is a member of ESARDA (European Safeguards Research and Development 
Association) and it has appointed experts to the association’s committees, several working 
groups and publishing committee. STUK is also a member of ESARDA's Steering Committee 
and Executive Board. STUK’s expert acts as the vice-chair of the Implementation of Safeguards 
working group. ESARDA held its biennial spring meeting in Luxembourg as a webinar in 
November 2020. The objective is to continuously monitor and respond to the needs of 
ESARDA’s members.
The Low Level Liaison Committee (LLLC) meeting held in Vienna on 26 September 2012 
recommended the establishment of a working group to coordinate the activities of the 
Encapsulation Plant and Geological Repository (EPGR) project and to be attended by the 
representatives of the IAEA, European Commission, Sweden and Finland. The LLLC EPGR 
work group would be a cooperation group and ensure good communications and cooperation 
between all parties and report regularly to the LLLC. The preparation of the safeguards 
oversight concepts has started simultaneously with the development of the final disposal 
concepts and technologies. The observation of safeguards-by-design in plant design is possible 
through close cooperation of the plant designers, plant operating personnel and authorities. 
In November 2020, Finland hosted the ninth EPGR meeting remotely. The main topics of 
last year’s meeting included the plans for the safeguards-by-design oversight of Posiva’s 
encapsulation plant and the underground final disposal facility. In addition to the actual EPGR 
meeting, three tripartite meetings (Finland, EC and IAEA) were held on the oversight of the 
repository and several technical meetings on the detailed plans for the technical supervision of 
the encapsulation plant.
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Objects of regulation
Loviisa nuclear power plant
Plant unit Start-up National grid Nominal electric power 
(gross/net, MW)
Ty pe, supplier
Loviisa 1 8 Feb 1977 9 May 1977 531/507 Pressurised water reactor (PWR), Atomenergoexport
Loviisa 2 4 Nov 1980 5 Jan 1981 531/507 Pressurised water reactor (PWR), Atomenergoexport
Fortum Power and Heat Oy owns the Loviisa 1 and 2 plant units located in Loviisa.
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Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
Plant unit Start-up National grid Nominal electric power 
(gross/net, MW)
Type, supplier
Olkiluoto 1 2 Sep 1978 10 Oct 1979 920/890 Boiling water reactor (BWR), Asea Atom
Olkiluoto 2 18 Feb 1980 1 Jul 1982 920/890 Boiling water reactor (BWR), Asea Atom
Olkiluoto 3 Operating licence granted on 
7 Mar 2019
Approx. 1,600 (net) Boiling water reactor (BWR), Areva NP
Teollisuuden Voima Oyj owns the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 plant units located in Olkiluoto, Eurajoki and  
the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit under commissioning.
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Hanhikivi nuclar power plant project
Plant unit Supplemented deci-
sion-in-principle approved
Nominal electric power, net 
(MW)
Type, supplier
Hanhikivi 1 5 Dec 2014 Approx. 1,200 Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR), ROSATOM
Hanhikivi nuclear power plant FH1 is a power plant project of Fennovoima.
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Olkiluoto encapsulation plant and disposal facility
Diagram of the Olkiluoto encapsulation and disposal facility (Posiva Oy).
In November 2015, the Government granted Posiva a construction licence for the Olkiluoto 
encapsulation plant and disposal facility. The planned facility consists of a surface facility 
for the encapsulation of spent nuclear fuel, an underground disposal facility, and supporting 
buildings. Posiva has already built an access tunnel, three shafts and a technical facility and 
research area at a depth of 420–437 metres as parts of the underground research facility 
Onkalo. The construction of the disposal facility started at the end of 2016. For the actual 
disposal facility, the underground facility will be expanded by two additional shafts and the 
disposal tunnels that will be excavated in stages. The construction of an underground research 
facility was a prerequisite for granting a construction licence.
The encapsulation plant is an above-ground facility for the encapsulation of spent nuclear 
fuel that is constructed above the disposal facility. The construction of the encapsulation plant 
was started in summer 2019. From the encapsulation plant, the capsules will be transferred 
along an elevator shaft to the disposal facility to be disposed of in the disposal holes in 
underground tunnels.
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FiR 1 research reactor
Plant Thermal power In operation Fuel TRIGA reactor’s fuel 
type
TRIGA Mark II 
research reactor
250 kW 03/1962 – 06/2015 reactor core contains 




8% of uranium 
91% of zirconium and 
1% of hydrogen
The use of VTT’s FiR 1 research reactor in Otaniemi, Espoo, started in March 1962. VTT ended the use of the reactor in June 
2015, and the reactor was placed into a permanent shutdown state. VTT submitted the operating licence application regarding 
decommissioning to the Government in June 2017.
Other objects of regulatory control
In accordance with Section 2 of the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987), the regulatory control of 
the use of nuclear energy covers the nuclear material used, for example, in certain research 
laboratories and in industry. The control also covers nuclear equipment, systems and 
information as well as nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities and 
the transport of nuclear materials and nuclear waste. In addition, the regulatory control 
of the use of nuclear energy covers mining and milling operations aimed at producing 
uranium or thorium. The planned Terrafame uranium extraction plant is part of this group. 
The intermediate products of metal industry containing uranium are also included in the 
regulatory control of the use of nuclear energy when the concentration, as defined by the 
nuclear material specification, is exceeded in an industrial process or product.
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Significant events at 
nuclear power plants
Loviisa power plant
Loviisa annual outage, 2 August–23 October 2020
Loviisa nuclear power plant’s annual outage started with the short refuelling outage of the 
Loviisa 2 plant unit, which ended on 26 August 2020. After this, on 29 August, the Loviisa plant 
unit’s extensive inspection outage carried out at eight-year intervals was launched, including, 
for example, emptying the reactor from nuclear fuel for inspection purposes. A large number 
of modifications were also carried out during the extensive annual outage. The Loviisa 1 annual 
outages were completed on 23 October 2020. 
Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, the annual outages of both units were carried out to the 
extent originally planned and there was no need to postpone any planned work to future 
annual outages. Fortum had prepared for the exceptional circumstances with related procedure 
and implementation well in advance of the annual outages and also during them. STUK 
monitored the measures and ensured that lessons learned at other plants and countries were 
taken into account in the activities. STUK had to slightly adapt its inspection and control 
routines due to the COVID-19 pandemic. STUK only carried out the inspections deemed 
necessary onsite and supervised the various sites more extensively with the help of remote 
connections. 
One important aspect of the plant’s ageing management was the further work carried out 
on the plant’s I&C reform, which was concluded in 2018, to ensure the future functioning of the 
protection I&C systems, control rods and emergency diesel generators. 
Loviisa 1’s extensive reactor pressure vessel’s inspections verified, among other things, that 
the 2016 inspection observation (indication) of a reactor pressure vessel water supply unit has 
remained small and has no impact on the safe operation of the reactor. Also the possible causes 
of the sound observations reported by the reactor pressure vessel’s foreign material control 
system since the end of 2019 were investigated. For this reason, several additional inspections 
were carried out for the internal parts of the reactor pressure vessel in addition to the normal 
inspections. In addition to searching for foreign material, these inspections focused on 
investigating possible wear and tear of the internal parts of the reactor as well as specific 
targets that might be linked to the foreign material control system’s observations. Despite 
the extensive inspections, no definitive cause could be established. Fortum will continue to 
monitor the matter during the 2020–2021 operating cycle and STUK will supervise Fortum’s 
measures. Fortum also carried out pressure tests on the Loviisa 1 primary and secondary 
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circuits, as well as a leak test of the containment, to ensure that their structures were in 
condition to continue safe operation.
STUK monitored these tests and reviewed the inspection and test results before authorising 
the plant to restart.
The 2020 annual outage was supervised by approximately 30 STUK experts. They ensured 
that Fortum took care of radiation and nuclear safety during the annual outage work. During 
the annual outages, STUK also carried out an inspection of the annual outages in accordance 
with the operational inspection programme. No safety deficiencies that would have required 
immediate intervention by STUK emerged during the inspection. The inspection summary is 
provided in Appendix 3.
Based on the inspection and regulatory control by STUK, the annual outages were carried 
out safely, and all planned work important in terms of safety was completed.
Further investigations of the Loviisa 2 emergency diesel cooling piping 2019 event
The cooling piping of Loviisa 2 emergency diesel generators were replaced during the 2018 
annual outage. After this, leaks were discovered in the new piping of one of the diesels in 
summer 2019 before the annual outages. According to Fortum’s investigations, the leaks 
were caused by a fatigue fracture resulting from vibration of the piping. Based on the results 
of test operations and strength calculations, Fortum estimated that the piping installed in 
2018 cannot withstand the strong vibration caused by the diesel engine unit and the forced 
displacement at different points of the pipes connected to the vibration. During the 2019 
annual outage, Fortum added flexible rubber hose elements to two diesel engines to resolve the 
service life issues caused by the vibration. STUK approved the approach and designs for piping 
modifications. The matter was reported in the 2019 annual report. 
In October 2019, Fortum submitted for STUK’s approval an operational event report 
describing the course of events and analysing the lessons learned and corrective measures 
taken. As a follow-up measure, Fortum conducted a more extensive root cause analysis of the 
event, which investigated the various design phases of the replacement of the diesel engine 
cooling water piping conduced in 2018 and the decision-making during the 2018 annual outage. 
Fortum submitted this analysis to STUK in spring 2020.
STUK monitored Fortum’s investigation and follow-up analysis of the event and also 
considered conducting its own investigation on the subject, but eventually decided to carry 
out a brief additional periodic inspection to complement Fortum’s extensive investigation. 
Description of the STUK inspection is presented in Appendix 3. The STUK inspection also 
included assessment on how YVL Guides and STUK monitoring have supported the licensee’s 
activities during the various stages of the event. STUK considers the observations made as part 
of the development of its regulatory control and instructions.
One key factor in the event was that the scope of the work and the effects of the 
modification on the dynamic behaviour of the structure were not identified at the beginning 
of the piping replacement planning. As the intention was to replace the old piping with a 
similar new one, Fortum had estimated that the replacement of the piping can be done as 
repair work instead of modification work. When the new piping was designed, the main 
focus was on the high quality of the welding joints, which had been found to be problematic 
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in terms of durability in the old piping. This meant that attention was not paid on the fact 
that routing changes were made to the new piping already at the design stage, and these 
changes had an effect on the piping’s vibration behaviour. Had the work been carried out as a 
modification, the problems that emerged later would have most likely been eliminated already 
at the beginning of the modification project. The scope of STUK’s data and construction 
inspections was also largely based on this same classification, which meant that it did not 
cover a more extensive perspective on the potential vibration issue. Another important issue 
is that due to earlier delays in the project, all of the piping replacements at the Loviisa 2 diesel 
generators were carried out during the same year, and that the underlying cause of the problem 
was only revealed after several test operations carried out in 2019 and not during the 2018 
commissioning tests. In this regard, it is important to pay attention in the future to the fact 
that long-term modification works are scheduled over several years and that in addition to the 
modification project, attention is also paid to the extent of test operation phases.
Based on the inspection, STUK required Fortum to take measures to ensure that sufficiently 
extensive expertise was used to form repair and modification solutions and to evaluate 
solutions as the work progressed. STUK also required measures to develop the organisational 
culture in such a way that it supports the challenging of solutions and the search for additional 
information also in situations that are challenging in terms of scheduling. 
Fortum replaced the rubber hose elements installed in 2019 and approved by STUK for 
one operating cycle with final ones during the 2020 annual outage. Significant leaks have not 
occurred in 2020 in either plant unit. Fortum is planning a similar modification work at Loviisa 
1 based on the operating experience gained from Loviisa 2.
 
Active impurities discovered in the outdoor area of Loviisa 2
Fortum’s radiation protection detected three radioactive particles in the power plant’s yard 
area in April 2020. The particles were found along the material transport route in front of the 
Loviisa 2 material corridor and staff facilities. Fortum had previously conducted measurements 
in the yard area in October 2019 following the annual outage, and these impurities were not 
discovered at the time.
The next time Fortum carried out contamination measurements in the yard area between 
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FIGURE A2.1 INES classified events at the Loviisa plant (INES Level 1).
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that no radioactivity had entered the yard during the material transports during annual outage 
or after. However, measurements in the yard area revealed plant-originating radioactivity 
at seven different locations. Fortum removed the radioactive particles from the yard, and 
measurements carried out in the power plant’s radiochemistry laboratory showed that the 
nuclide composition of the particles was similar to the observations made in April 2020.
According to Fortum’s laboratory analyses, the total activity of the particles found in the 
yard area was approximately 390 kBq. External exposure caused by the particles in the yard 
coating is insignificant, even if someone was continuously present in the vicinity of such a 
particle. If the particles were to enter and remain on bare skin or inside the body, they could 
cause a clearly abnormal radiation dose.
Fortum launched investigations in order to discover the origin of the radioactive particles 
and find out why they ended up in the yard. The measures defined based on the investigation 
are focused on cleaning the spent fuel transfer cask, protection of the casks during transport 
through the yard area, reducing the contaminants in the cask’s storage pools, developing 
contamination measurements in the yard areas and the possibility to transfer radioactive 
plant components in made-for-purpose transport shields. The necessary measures are to be 
introduced during 2021.
Similar observations were made in the plant’s yard area in 2010.
The event was rated at level 1 on the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale 
(INES), indicating that it is an anomaly with safety impacts.
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Olkiluoto power plant
Incorrectly assembled fuel elements at Olkiluoto 1
On 27 March 2020, TVO informed STUK that Olkiluoto 1 reactor has 20 fuel elements that have 
been manufactured incorrectly. The total number of fuel elements in the reactor is 500.
TVO was informed of the incorrectly assembled fuel elements by the fuel supplier.  According 
to the information received from the fuel supplier, 100 fuel assemblies delivered to TVO in 
spring 2019 had been incorrectly assembled. The fuel manufacturer had assembled these fuel 
assemblies with a 180° rotation of the rod chart. While the situation was investigated, TVO 
reduced the reactor power to 55% of full power. This way the company ensured that the plant 
remained in a safe state.
After the fuel supplier had notified TVO of the error, TVO lowered the Olkiluoto 1 power 
level to less than 60% to ensure the sufficiency of margins, after which TVO updated the 
reactor physical analyses in cooperation with the fuel supplier. STUK reviewed TVO’s analyses. 
The calculations allowed the plant to be operated safely at 94% power until the next scheduled 
fuel change. This took place during the annual outage, which started in May.
The root cause of the event was the fuel supplier’s assembly procedures, which enabled the 
occurrence of a human error. The fuel supplier used its software with incorrect setting. The 
error occurred in the orientation selection of the fuel assembly unit’s rod chart. As a result, 
there was a deviation between the physical direction of the fuel assembly and the direction 
interpreted by the software used in the assembly, and the fuel assemblies were assembled with 
a 180° rotation of the rod chart. The fuel plant produces two different types of fuel assemblies 
with a 180 degree difference in the orientation. The orientation selection used for these fuel 
assemblies were meant for the other type of assemblies, and the fuel manufacturer’s inspection 
procedures failed to notice this.
The fuel supplier corrected the incorrectly assembled fuel elements to correspond to the 
original design at the end of 2020.
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The event had no effect on nuclear or radiation safety. As the event posed a risk of common 
cause failure, it is rated at level 1 on the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale 
(INES), indicating that it is an anomaly with safety impacts.
Olkiluoto annual outage 10 May–8 June 2020
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, TVO’s Olkiluoto 1 annual outage was shortened from 25 days to 
14 days. The originally planned annual outage would have required a large amount of external 
workforce, and due to the pandemic, TVO did not want as many people simultaneously present 
at the plant as full annual outage would have required. However, TVO did carry out all work 
and inspections that are important for safety and operability. The short 8-day refuelling outage 
at Olkiluoto 2 was carried out as planned. The annual outage also included several special 
arrangements to prevent the spread of COVID-19. 
The Olkiluoto annual outage started on 10 May 2020, when TVO shut down Olkiluoto 2 
for a refuelling outage. During the refuelling outage, TVO replaced approximately a fifth of 
the nuclear fuel to fresh fuel and performed maintenance work included in a normal annual 
outage. TVO also continued the modification of the auxiliary feedwater system by installing 
new recirculating lines in two subsystems. The change has now been implemented in all 
Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2 subsystems, which has significantly reduced the plants’ dependence 
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FIGURE A2.6 Daily average gross electrical power of the Loviisa 2 plant unit in 2020.
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The Olkiluoto 1 maintenance outage started on 24 May 2020. TVO carried out normal 
annual outage work and replaced approximately a fifth of the nuclear fuel to fresh fuel. As a 
result of the COVID-19 pandemic, TVO postponed some of the work planned to be carried out 
at Olkiluoto 1 to a later date. This way, TVO was able to reduce the number of workers involved 
in annual outage and thus protect the workers from contracting COVID-19. The maintenance 
work postponed by TVO included tasks that did not need to be completed immediately. For 
example, STUK approved the primary circuit pressure test required in connection with the 
renewal of the operating licence to be carried out during the 2021 annual outage. The decision 
was supported by the results of the strength analyses of the reactor pressure vessel and good 
experiences from a similar test performed at Olkiluoto 2 in 2019. 
The annual outages ended when, after STUK had issued a start-up permit, unit 1 of the 
Olkiluoto power plant was reconnected to the national grid on 8 June.
Despite the COVID-19 pandemic, the annual outages were carried out normally in terms of 
radiation protection. In order to prevent infection, TVO had, among other things, intensified 
the disinfection of personal monitors and electronic dosimeters, so that exceptional 
arrangements would not jeopardise the monitoring and control of radiation doses. The 
radiation doses of the personnel who participated in the annual outage of the Olkiluoto power 
plant were significantly below the dose limits laid down in the Radiation Decree as well as the 
dose restrictions set for itself by the power company.
STUK had to slightly adapt its inspection and control routines due to the COVID-19 
pandemic. The health of STUK inspectors and annual outage workers was a priority. For 
example, STUK only carried out inspections deemed necessary onsite and supervised the 
annual outage with the help of remote connections more than before. 
The annual outage was supervised by approximately 30 STUK experts, half onsite and half 
remotely. Despite the exceptional circumstances, regulatory control was carried out with the 
same level of accuracy and extent as before. This control ensured that TVO took appropriate 
care of radiation and nuclear safety during the annual outage work. 
During the annual outages, STUK also carried out an inspection of the annual outages in 
accordance with the operational inspection programme. Inspection topics included updating 
the operating instructions as a result of modifications, radiation protection, installation 
of the electrical penetration of the containment, management of foreign material, and the 
operation of the organisation and decision-making to ensure safety. As a general theme of the 
inspection, the possible effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the resulting measures on the 
safe execution of the annual outage were also observed. The inspection summary is provided in 
Appendix 3.
Based on the inspection and regulatory control by STUK, the annual outages were carried 
out safely and all planned work important in terms of safety was completed. According to 
STUK’s observations, the safety measures carried out by TVO due to the COVID-19 pandemic 
did not hinder the safe execution of the annual outage work. The COVID-19 measures were 
taken seriously and TVO reviewed their effects throughout the annual outage.
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A steam line radiation spike halted Olkiluoto 2 on 10 December 2020
On 10 December 2020 at 12:22 pm, an automatic reactor scram and containment isolation 
(I isolation) occurred at Olkiluoto 2, which resulted in TVO declaring a plant emergency in 
accordance with the instructions. The reactor scram was caused by a momentary increase 
in the radiation intensity in the plant’s steam lines. The 3–4 fold increase in the radiation 
level in comparison to the normal level triggered as an automatic precaution a reactor scram, 
containment isolation and sprinkling with water. The security systems worked as planned.
The radiation spike was caused by too hot water entering the filters of the reactor's 
purification system. As a result, material was released from the filters, causing the radiation 
levels in the steam pipes to rise. There was no damage to the reactor fuel, so there was no risk 
of harmful radioactive emissions.
In such a case, the containment isolation and sprinkling are activated in case the rise in the 
radiation level is caused by a sudden fuel damage or pipe damage threatening the safety of the 
reactor. Neither was involved in this event and there was no actual radiation accident or threat 
thereof. The event did not pose a risk to workers or the environment.
According to the instructions, the situation also triggered the activities of emergency 
response organisations at both TVO and STUK. STUK’s operations are based on the 
information available of the event and the implementation of the plant’s safety operations, 
and at the early stage, approximately 80 people at STUK monitored the development of 
the situation. The situation was managed to the extent required by the original situation 
information, until at 15:42, TVO lowered the emergency situation classification based on its 
own verified research results and investigations. However, very early into the situation it was 
known that there was no risk of emissions to the environment.
Following the reactor scram, TVO brought the plant into a cold shutdown. TVO investigated 
the root causes of the event and carried out the necessary investigations, inspections and 
maintenance work to ensure the functioning of all equipment and systems important to safety. 
STUK supervised the work onsite and reviewed the reports submitted by TVO. According to 
STUK’s assessment, TVO carried out the required investigations and inspections thoroughly, 
thereby ensuring the safety of the plant. STUK issued a start-up permit to the plant unit on 15 
December 2020. 
STUK estimates that the event is rated at level 0 on the International Nuclear and 
Radiological Event Scale (INES). The event was exceptional, but its significance to nuclear and 
radiation safety was minor and it could not be placed on the actual seven-step scale of the 
INES evaluation system.
Although there was no real danger or threat of danger, the first indications of the situation 
communicated the possibility of an accident, so the measures taken by TVO, STUK and other 
organisations to ensure safety were justified and in accordance with the emergency procedures.
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Periodic inspection programme 
of nuclear power plants 2020
Inspections included in the periodic inspection programme focus on safety management, operational 
main processes and procedures as well as the technical acceptability of systems. The compliance of safety 
assessments, operation, maintenance and protection activities with the requirements of nuclear safety 
regulations are verified with the inspections. No material deficiencies with an effect on the safety of the 
plant, the personnel or the environment were observed in the 2020 inspections.
 In spring 2020, STUK postponed most of the inspections to be carried out in the autumn. Behind this 
decision was STUK’s resolve that only inspections deemed necessary in terms of safety would be physically 
carried out at nuclear plants during the COVID-19 epidemic. At the end of summer, STUK stated that 
inspections under the 2020 inspection programmes would be carried out in accordance with the approved 
programme. These inspections have been carried out both remotely and physically at plant sites. The 
precondition for remote inspections is that STUK receives all the information it needs from the inspection 
and can use this information to assess the state of safety and verify compliance with the regulations.
Basic programme
Inspections in 2020
Loviisa 1 and 2 Olkiluoto 1, 2 and 3
I&C technology x
Human resources and competence x
Management and safety culture x
Management system x x
Disposal facilities x
Chemistry x
Mechanical technology x x
Interim storage of spent nuclear fuel x
Operating experience feedback x
Operation x
Plant maintenance x x
Fire protection x
Utilisation of the PRA x
Structures and buildings x
Electrical technology x
Radiation Protection x x
Nuclear security x x
Safety design x x
Safety functions
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Basic programme
Inspections in 2020
Loviisa 1 and 2 Olkiluoto 1, 2 and 3
Emergency response arrangements x
Power plant waste x
Annual outage x x
Nuclear safeguards x
Special subjects
Management of human factors x
Decontamination operations x
Leakages of EC cooling water lines x
Matters concerning Olkiluoto 3 are also reviewed in the periodic inspection programme of Olkiluoto if the matters to be 
reviewed are common for the whole of TVO, not merely plant unit-specific. Plant unit-specific (OL1/2 and OL3) inspections are 
Conduct of operations, Plant maintenance, Safety Functions and Annual outage.
Inspections in accordance with the periodic 
inspection programme at the Loviisa plant
Additional inspection: Leakages of EC cooling water lines 27 February–8 May 2020
The cooling piping of Loviisa 2 emergency diesel generators were replaced in the 2018 annual 
outage. After this, several leaks were detected in the piping in 2019 and due to the gravity 
of the issue, the decision was made to carry out an additional inspection on the matter. The 
inspection focused on the events following the cooling piping replacement and focused mainly 
on the events and activities following the 1-diesel cooling pipe leak observed at Loviisa 2 in 
summer 2019. The inspection was carried out at four separate times, during which several 
power plant employees were interviewed and the documents drafted during the cooling 
piping replacement project and the reports prepared on the 2019 incident were reviewed. The 
inspection and the interviews were for the most part carried out remotely.
The inspection focused particularly on:
• the organisation’s decision-making in a problematic situation
• the interaction and communication between Fortum and STUK at various stages
• justification and clarifications of technical solutions during the annual outage
• Fortum’s views on diesel generator’s cooling piping solutions based on their experience at 
Loviisa 2.
During the inspection, it was observed that during annual outage, schedule pressures have a 
strong impact on the operations at the plant. The resulting urgency affects the extent to which 
Fortum utilises its expertise to evaluate and challenge various solutions. When being rushed, 
Fortum’s operational decision-making process supports and guides the organisation towards 
conservative decision-making, but the procedure is not able to fully control the effects of 
urgency, which does not always lead to the optimal result.
Based on the inspection, the fact that Fortum originally decided to carry out the 
replacement of emergency diesel cooling pipes as internal line organisation repair work 
resulted in insufficient use of expertise regarding, for example, vibrations. Furthermore, at 
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the very beginning, Fortum excluded all solution alternatives that, according to the power 
company’s interpretation, would have required a deviation application from the YVL Guides. 
Based on the inspection, STUK required that Fortum must reassess its current modification 
procedures, which have been developed since 2016. The procedures must consider appropriately 
extensive expertise at the beginning of the design phase as well as independent review 
that sufficiently challenges the design at various stages of the modification or repair work. 
Furthermore, STUK required Fortum to develop its organisational culture towards encouraging 
the challenging of solutions and searching for additional information in accordance with the 
conservative decision-making culture outside its own organisation also in challenging and 
urgent situations.
In the case of emergency diesel cooling piping, the modification and its safety have been 
covered separately through STUK’s usual control methods, and STUK has approved the 
measures taken in the 2019 annual outage and will review the plans to improve the piping.
Decontamination operations, 29 April 2020 
The licensee's procedures relating to the implementation, maintenance and development of 
decontamination operations (cleaning radioactive substances from the plant’s process systems) 
were reviewed during the inspection. Particular attention was paid on investigating the impact 
of decontamination operations as a factor reducing radiation doses. In addition, the 2020 
inspection addressed the management of deviations related to decontamination operations. 
Decontamination of individuals had been excluded from the inspection of decontamination 
operations. The inspection was carried out remotely. In addition, STUK monitored the 
operations as part of the supervision of the 2020 annual outages. 
Based on the inspection, Fortum has clearly assumed overall responsibility for 
decontamination operations.
However, STUK’s inspection observations show that there is still room for improvement in 
the instructions on radiation protection principles and practices related to decontamination 
work. STUK required Fortum to reassess the comprehensiveness and consistency of the 
decontamination instructions with regard to matters related to radiation protection and to 
update the instructions where necessary. 
Based on STUK’s inspection observations, it also remained unclear what Fortum’s 
instructions on the aims of decontamination operations and special cleaning are, as well as the 
monitoring and reporting on these aims. For this reason, STUK required Fortum to investigate 
how its decontamination operations implement the monitoring of decontamination efficiency 
and to evaluate the planning and monitoring procedures related to its decontamination 
operations.
Radiation protection, 14–15 May 2020
The inspection concerning radiation protection focused on radiation protection, radiation 
measurements and release and environmental monitoring at the nuclear power plant. The 
inspection focused on administrative radiation protection. A particular target was the Loviisa 
nuclear power plant’s ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) operation, of which Fortum 
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had prepared a self-assessment. In addition, the joint theme of this year’s periodic inspections 
is deviation management. The inspection was carried out remotely. 
STUK had requested Fortum to draft a report on the implementation of the ALARA 
principles and the timeliness of the procedures at the power plant. During the inspection, it 
was established that the report was well prepared and that it included extensive development 
targets, and that good progress had already been made on reaching these targets. 
Radiation protection procedures in deviation management were covered during the 
inspection. Fortum had made comprehensive observations on events related to radiation 
protection, had taken the necessary corrective measures and forwarded the observations within 
the organisation. Particular focus was paid on the discovery of radioactive particles in the yard 
area of the Loviisa power plant and their research results. The particles were discovered and 
recovered on 9 April 2020 during verifying contamination measurements of the yard areas 
performed by Fortum. 
STUK presented one requirement during the inspection, requesting that a suitability 
assessment of an electronic dosimeter measuring neutron dose be submitted to STUK.
Human resources and competence, 27–28 May 2020 
The topics of the inspection included a development project on competence management, 
ensuring system managers’ resources and competence, as well as supervisory work at the 
Loviisa power plant. The inspection was carried out remotely. Fortum had responded to STUK’s 
preliminary questions.
During the inspection, Fortum presented the progress of the power plant’s competence 
management development project. The project is lagging behind its original schedule. The data 
system is currently being piloted.
The inspection covered the Loviisa power plant’s procedures for ensuring system managers’ 
resources and competence management. Fortum has redefined and partly redistributed the 
system responsibilities in its LOLTO (Loviisa Long Term Operation) project and has also 
established that all plant systems must have a system manager. A large number of the system 
managers attend to this task in addition to their main duties. There are no appointed deputies 
for system managers, and when a person leaves the organisation, the task is transferred to 
the supervisor until a successor has been appointed. Ageing monitoring reports have not 
been finalised on time, which may communicate the lack of resources available for work and 
prioritisation of work tasks. System managers play a key role in managing the ageing of a plant 
and therefore, in accordance with requirement 308 of Guide YVL A.4, persons performing these 
tasks must have deputies. STUK presented a requirement that deputies must be appointed to 
all system managers of systems that are essential to the safety of the nuclear power plant.
The third object of the inspection was supervisory work at the Loviisa power plant. The 
management of the power plant, Fortum Group, the power plant HR section and training 
group are among the parties in charge of the induction, training and operating conditions of 
supervisors.  The expectations and practices related to the supervisory and managerial duties 
at the Loviisa power plant have not been defined in a way that would systematically take into 
account the above-mentioned parties as a whole and the requirements of the nuclear sector. 
Instructions related to managerial work are available in various locations, e.g. on Fortum’s 
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intranet, and have not been compiled into procedures. STUK issued a requirement that Fortum 
must assess its management’s expectations regarding managerial work and leadership at the 
Loviisa power plant and also evaluate the induction, training and assessment practices as an 
entity and ensure that they cover the nuclear sector’s requirements on managerial work and 
leadership.
Power plant waste, 4 June 2020
STUK focused its nuclear waste management inspection on the Loviisa power plant’s waste 
management resources and instructions as well as the current measures of nuclear waste 
management. The inspection covered the observations of the previous inspection, the up-
to-dateness of the instructions and the current waste management measures, such as the 
commissioning of an intermediate level waste disposal repository, the situation regarding the 
treatment of damaged waste packages and the main ongoing measures concerning solid waste 
management. In addition, the functionality of Fortum’s deviation management procedure was 
reviewed with the help of an example case. The inspection was carried out remotely.
Fortum has launched a development project on the resources of the group responsible 
for radioactive waste in 2019. In STUK’s view, Fortum has carried out a very thorough study 
and analysis of the waste organisation’s current competence and resources in connection 
of launching the development project. Based on the study, Fortum has taken measures to 
ensure a sufficient level of competence and resources for the coming years.   The guidelines 
on waste management are up-to-date, with the exception of the guidelines on shipments of 
radioactive waste abroad, and during the inspection, STUK issued a requirement to update 
these guidelines. 
STUK stated that Fortum had made progress in its waste management measures. The 
intermediate level waste disposal repository has been commissioned. Progress has been made 
in the treatment of damaged waste barrels, and next, they will be packed in concrete waste 
packaging. The investigation into the causes of the damage had been launched. In addition, the 
emptying of the power plant’s old waste storage and the repackaging of waste for final disposal 
have continued. 
Fortum has continued to solidify liquid waste into concrete at the solidification plant. 
As regards premises, Fortum had made an investment decision on building a new hall for 
the control of metal waste for exemption measurements and storage of waste packaging. 
Once completed, the new hall will improve working conditions significantly.  The handling 
of the deviation related to waste records was handled in accordance with Fortum’s deviation 
procedure. The reasons leading up to the incident had been thoroughly investigated and the 
necessary corrective measures had been taken.
Annual outages 2 August–23 October 2020 
The annual outage inspection covered and verified the power plant’s annual outage actions 
used to maintain safety as well as the actions used to manage and control operations during 
an annual outage. STUK inspectors from various fields of technology participated in the 
inspection. They each had their own predetermined inspection areas. Furthermore, STUK 
carried out general supervision in the plant area, for example, by carrying out plant tours 
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and monitoring the progress of work and the related radiation protection procedures. STUK 
inspectors also paid particular attention to the management of foreign material when moving 
around the plant. STUK also monitored the prioritisation of safety in Fortum’s decision-
making process. Despite the COVID-19 epidemic, Fortum was able to arrange its work so that 
the annual outages of both plant units were carried out in accordance with the original plans. 
The COVID-19 epidemic was also taken into account in the STUK inspection – all inspection 
areas for which monitoring at the plant site was not necessary were carried out remotely.
During the annual outage inspection, particular focus was paid on the replacement of the 
reactor pressure vessel cover’s bushings at Loviisa 2 and on the additional inspections of the 
Loviisa 1 reactor pressure vessel due to suspected foreign material. Other inspection targets 
included the I&C replacement of emergency diesel generators at Loviisa 1, lifting in the reactor 
hall, radiation protection procedures for work tasks and contamination control in sampling, 
decontamination operations and the effects of the additional circuit of the primary circuit 
cleaning system implemented in 2019.
In the regulatory control targeting the management of foreign material, STUK verified the 
procedures implemented by Fortum during the annual outage both in the controlled areas 
of the plant units and in the turbine halls. Although no development measures related to 
training had been implemented at the Loviisa power plant due to COVID-19 epidemic, the 
annual outage inspection showed improvement in the use of foreign material protection and 
improved practises of storing items compared to recent years. Based on STUK’s observations, 
foreign material management has improved. However, STUK considers it important that any 
observations made in foreign material management are treated with due seriousness and that 
operations are systematically developed also in future.
STUK carried out its regulatory control targeting the radiation protection activities by 
carrying out plant tour and by having discussing with the representatives of Fortum and 
contractors. Based on STUK’s observations, most of the work areas established to prevent 
the spread of contamination were separated and marked clearly, and there were sufficient 
protective equipment available at the work areas. The level of cleanliness at the controlled area 
remained for the most part good during the annual outage and major contamination spreads 
were avoided. During the annual outages, there were several abnormal incidents related to 
radiation protection, and Fortum has prepared operational event reports on them. For example, 
radioactive contaminants were discovered during measurements carried out in the plant’s 
yard area during the annual outage. STUK considered it important that Fortum thoroughly 
investigates the root causes of the contaminant’s migration the yard areas and takes all 
necessary corrective measures.
STUK also supervised the replacement of the Loviisa 2 reactor pressure vessel cover’s 
bushings. Fortum developed, where necessary, inspection procedures during the repair process. 
From the radiation protection point of view, the replacement of the cover bushings went 
smoothly.
During the operating cycle 2019–2020, the Loviisa 1 reactor pressure tank’s foreign material 
monitoring system detected additional noises, causing Fortum to carry out additional 
inspections. In STUK’s view, these inspections were comprehensive and STUK did not have any 
remarks on the way that the inspections were carried out. However, based on the inspection, no 
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clear reason for the observations was discovered. Fortum will continue to monitor the situation 
during the 2020–2021 operating cycle, and STUK will supervise Fortum’s measures.
STUK supervised the I&C replacement of Loviisa 1’s emergency diesels by participating 
in the project’s daily monitoring meetings, reviewing the interim stage review protocols, 
and monitoring hot tests and diesel start-up sequence tests. Fortum adopted an active role 
in observing any deficiencies in activities and correcting them Overall, the installation and 
commissioning went ahead as planned. In terms of the modifications, no factors were found 
that would have had a significant effect on the planned tests or installations in terms of safety.
Several individual incidents took place during the annual outage of Loviisa 2 that showed 
deficiencies in lifting operations. For this reason, STUK established lifting operations as one 
of the additional topics of the annual outage inspection at Loviisa 1, where STUK interviewed 
employees responsible for lifting operations and also observed lifting activities in the reactor 
hall on one day. Fortum had clearly addressed the deficiencies discovered and no similar 
deficiencies were observed in the lifting operations at Loviisa 1. STUK will continue to monitor 
lifting operations and their management also in the future.  
No deviations that would have required immediate intervention by STUK were observed in 
the operations of Fortum during the annual outage. According to STUK’s findings, the annual 
outages were performed safely.
Security arrangements – physical protection, 21–25 September 2020
The inspection focused on the plant’s security arrangements, which are considered to include 
structural, technical, operational and organisational arrangements to detect, delay and prevent 
illegal or unauthorised activities. With regard to security arrangements, both the topic areas 
related to physical security arrangements and the interfaces and the interface issues related to 
information security were examined.
Deviation management was a particular focus, and for its part, it was stated that 
the handling of deviations, deficiencies and observations and the documentation of 
the information resulting from them seemed appropriate and sufficient in the security 
arrangements. No requirements were issued in the inspection.
Security arrangements – information security, 21–25 September 2020
The information security inspection was carried out at the same time with another security 
arrangement inspection: the physical protection inspection. The security inspection reviewed 
the structure of data networks and their security controls.
The inspection focused on activities related to the management of deviations, for the 
part of which, the measures related to the handling of events, deviations, deficiencies and 
observations were reviewed. Based on the inspection, these matters appeared to be appropriate 
and sufficient. No requirements were issued in the inspection.
Management system, 6–8 October 2020
The inspection covered the procedures by which Fortum manages deviations and the risks 
associated with its operations. The licensee’s organisation and the development of Loviisa’s 
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operations from the point of view of the independent assessment of nuclear safety were also 
covered.
The inspection addressed the grounds on which Fortum defines which parts of Fortum’s 
organisation fall under the licensee’s organisation. Based on the inspection, STUK required 
Fortum to clarify the definition. Based on the inspection, Loviisa has transferred the 
independent assessment of its operations to the plant’s nuclear safety unit, which has initiated 
new reporting procedures related to this matter. STUK will monitor the further development 
of operations under its further monitoring. 
The inspection also addressed the plant’s deviation management procedures and verified 
their situation. There have been delays in the performance of the related corrective measures 
initiated by Fortum, and STUK required Loviisa to settle the situation. 
As regards risk management, the licensee has started to develop its operations based on 
self-assessment. New procedures were discussed during the inspection and risk management 
was verified. The procurement process description required by the previous management 
system inspection was found to be appropriate.
Operating experience feedback, 20 October 2020
The inspection focused on external operating experience feedback, for which procedures and 
their functionality were verified with the help of example cases; the processing of operating 
experiences and events of other plants, utilisation of experiences and reporting outside the 
plant. Also deviation management related to operating experience feedback was inspected. 
Fortum updated the operating experience feedback process of the Loviisa plant during 2018, 
at which time the internal and external operating experience procedures were merged into 
the same process. In this context, instructions were also updated to ensure that the procedure 
corresponds to the process and the work instructions describe the activities more accurately 
on a practical level. The development measures that have continued since then are still partly 
unfinished: efforts have been made to improve efficiency, indicators and monitoring have been 
added, and some development targets have also been identified in self-assessments. Based on 
the verification of example cases, the processing of external events has become faster and the 
processing is available in the plant’s data systems. In STUK’s view, Fortum has made effort to 
improve its operations to correct the observed deficiencies and development findings. The 
adequacy of resources or operations and the effectiveness of the corrective measures cannot yet 
be fully assessed, as the development measures are still in progress.
STUK will monitor the progress of Fortum’s work and development measures in connection 
with other supervision and processing of reports (such as the annual report). On the basis of 
the inspection, STUK presented no requirements.
Management of human factors , 3–5 November 2020
STUK reviewed Fortum’s management of human factors related to safety. Management of 
human factors was selected as an inspection topic in order to verify that it meets the standards 
that have become more exact as a result of changes to the regulation. The inspection covered 
three different areas of human factors:
• The role of human factors and organisational issues in event investigation
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• Human Factors Engineering (HFE)
• Further development of human factors management
Event investigations, current development measures and modification projects at the plant 
were used as examples in the inspection.
For the part of the event investigations, STUK observed that Fortum has recently utilised 
less human and organisational factors specialists in its investigation. Fortum’s instructions do 
not include exact criteria for the kinds of events requiring thorough investigation of human 
and organisational factors with the help of special expertise. However, Fortum does have access 
to experts who could participate in the investigation of events from this perspective. STUK 
requires Fortum to strengthen the utilisation of expertise in the investigation of human and 
organisational factors and to specify its instructions in such a way that the scope of human 
and organisational factors processing and the expertise used in it are planned consistently and 
transparently in all investigations.
During the inspection, STUK also examined how the process computer used to control 
the plant had been further developed based on events and other usage needs. The process 
computer is developed in three different lines, and the development is mainly based on 
the direct development needs identified in use. In addition, Fortum is currently examining 
the development of the emergency function. According to information received by STUK, 
the development of the process computer does not fully correspond to the level of quality 
management required by its significance in the control of the plant. STUK requires Fortum 
to review the observations made by STUK and, if necessary, to develop its process computer 
development procedures.
During the inspection, STUK examined Fortum’s human factors engineering (HFE) 
procedures, e.g. in modifications. Fortum has some procedures in place, but the systematic 
employment of the HFE program is not currently part of Fortum’s practice. During the 
inspection, STUK found that the HFE procedure competence in the Loviisa power plant 
organisation is currently not at the level required to systematically integrate HFE in the design 
procedures. Based on the inspection, STUK required Fortum to develop its procedures to 
take human factors into account in design and to examine the development needs of its own 
instructions in this regard.
Plant maintenance, 10–11 November 2020
The sufficiency of the resources, functions and tasks relating to the condition monitoring 
and maintenance of the Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 2 plant units to ensure safe operation in 
design basis conditions was assessed in the inspection. The inspection focused particularly 
on the human resources of maintenance and the extent and procedures of the plant units’ 
ageing management programme. The selected inspection targets included load monitoring 
procedures, qualification requirements for system managers and their deputies, monitoring of 
maintenance tasks and data on ageing management monitoring reports, such as the validity 
of I&C equipment’s time-limited qualifications. The inspection did not reveal any significant 
deficiencies in the maintenance of the Loviisa plant units. Based on the inspection, STUK 
required Fortum to submit a plan for the modernisation of the continuous temperature and 
82 STUK-B 267 / MAY 2021
APPENDIX 3 PERIODIC INSPECTION PROGRAMME OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
elongation measurement system originally installed at Loviisa 1, as well as a supplemented 
strength analysis register already submitted to STUK based on the previous inspection. 
Mechanical technology, 30 November 2020
The power company’s activities related to ensuring the integrity and reliable function of 
mechanical equipment and structures were assessed during the inspection. The inspection 
focused on the scope and sufficiency of the verification of the operability of the containment’s 
sprinkler system equipment, testing procedures for the pumps of three different systems in 
safety classes 2 and 3, and the way Fortum applies the piping condition monitoring programme 
in practice. In addition, the inspection procedures of hoisting accessories and fuel handling 
equipment at the plant were reviewed during the inspection.
Based on the inspection, the preventative maintenance activities and operability 
monitoring of the containment’s sprinkler system are comprehensive and sufficient. The 
testing procedures of the examined pumps were found to be sufficient and the results 
corresponded to the design standards set for the pumps. The current piping condition 
monitoring programme is mainly used as a databank and as an additional tool, and inspection 
targets are selected based on experience and inspection history. STUK did not have any 
remarks regarding the inspection of hoisting accessories and fuel handling equipment. STUK 
did not issue any requirements based on the inspection.
Fire protection, 1–2 December 2020
The inspection focused on the structural and active fire protection arrangements at the nuclear 
power plant and on operative fire-fighting. The inspection targets included the organisation, 
the training and equipment of the plant fire brigade, inspections and maintenance of active 
fire protection systems, modifications and repairs, inspections carried out by the licensee and 
other organisations, and operating experience feedback. As part of the inspection, four persons 
were interviewed on the management of deviations. In addition, Fortum and STUK discussed 
the handling of fire compartment structures as a part of the inspection.
Based on the inspection, the fire safety of the Loviisa nuclear power plants is at the level 
required by the applicable regulations. Resources have been strengthened during 2020. The 
Loviisa fire load management procedures have been further developed and fire safety has been 
improved, for example, a new hot work building was commissioned during the 2020 annual 
outage.
No requirements were issued in the inspection. STUK stated as an observation that it would 
be a good idea for the plant fire brigade to practice the activities brought along by the changes 
made to improve the cooling of the fuel tanks. 
Safety design, 2–3 December 2020
The inspection focused on the design activities of the Loviisa power plant. The inspection 
covered the organisations involved in the process and I&C design, the procedures used and 
their development needs, as well as the available resources.
The inspection focused particularly on the flow of information and document commentary 
between the technical fields and Fortum’s organisational units, the ongoing development 
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projects of the design process and instructions, and the use of subcontractors. The extensive 
and long-term renovation of the chemical station, the design work of which was mainly 
ordered from outside Fortum, the primary water purification cycle during annual outage and 
the renewal of plant protection were examined as examples of recent plant modifications. No 
requirements were presented based on the inspection.
Emergency response arrangements, 14–15 December 2020
The inspection regarding the emergency response arrangements covers the emergency 
response arrangements, procedures, facilities and training of the nuclear power plant. It 
covers the lessons learnt over the past year on emergency response operations, experiences 
and feedback on emergency response exercises and the development projects of emergency 
response operations. The inspection area also includes the automatic radiation monitoring 
of the environment, meteorological measurements and forecasting of dispersion. The 2020 
inspection also addressed the management of deviations related to emergency response 
arrangements.
Based on the inspection, STUK required Fortum to submit the entire emergency plan 
for approval, as many of the previous changes only covered parts of the plan and had been 
submitted for information. In addition, STUK required Fortum to provide STUK with a report 
on improving the operational prerequisites for the vacancies of the Radiation Protection 
Director and the Radiation Protection Measurement Manager. According to STUK’s view, 
the resources allocated to Fortum’s emergency response organisation’s radiation protection 
vacancies are small, especially from the point of view of the long-term situation, for example, 
in the event of an illness or a business trip. 
Fortum’s emergency response arrangements are at a good level and its organisation 
develops the emergency response arrangements in accordance with the regulations and 
procedures.
Inspections in accordance with the periodic 
inspection programme at the Olkiluoto plant
I&C technology, 25–26 November 2020
The inspection focused on the I&C technology systems, organisation and instructions at 
the OL1, OL2 and OL3 plant units. The inspection covered, for example, configuration and 
version management, the renewal programme of the electrical and I&C equipment inside the 
containment, as well as the maintenance organisation and resources.
No requirements were made based on the inspection, but some observations were made 
regarding the configuration management at the OL1 and OL2 plant units. The inspection 
verified, among other things, that the current practice e.g. in parameter management is 
fragmented due to different systems, among other things. During the inspection, it remained 
unclear how the parameter layout and storage of a software-based device or system are 
instructed to be inspected during the commissioning inspections. In addition, it was found 
that there is no description or image of the plant level I&C architecture and configuration. 
Such an image could be helpful in gaining a better understanding of e.g. system interfaces 
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and the dependencies between them and in verifying and ensuring their management. STUK 
monitors the issues above in its control.
Management system, management and safety culture, 10–11 November 2020
In its 2020 programme, STUK decided to merge the “Management system” and 
“Management and safety culture” inspections. In this inspection, STUK paid particular 
attention on the changed requirements related to the update of Guide YVL A.3 “Leadership 
and management for safety” and their implementation at TVO. Assessments made by TVO 
and related interpretations and measures were also examined. The inspection also included 
advance familiarisation with assessments made on TVO’s operations.
STUK had an open requirement regarding TVO’s ability to ensure that its suppliers have a 
healthy safety culture. TVO has carried out development work on being better able to assess 
the safety culture of suppliers in procurement, manufacturing and reception activities and 
disseminating information throughout the organisation. In STUK’s view, this development 
work seemed to be focused on procurement, while quality management has developed its 
own practices, and the two have remained separate from each other. Based on the inspection, 
STUK issued a requirement that TVO must at the beginning of 2021 present the development 
measures that remained unfinished at the time of the inspection in order to ensure uniform 
data collection and dissemination within the organisation. 
The inspection covered various TVO assessments, such as international peer reviews 
(WANO, IAEA), technology department self-assessment, personnel surveys and the final 
evaluation practice of projects. In STUK’s view, TVO’s organisational assessment activities 
are versatile, comprehensive, self-critical and inclusive. The overall picture of organisational 
matters that are important to safety presented to the management seems clear.
Examples of other changes to the requirements of Guide YVL A.3, including stakeholder 
work, staff’s ability to communicate on work-related matters, the content of the quality plan 
and the employment of the Graded Approach principle were also covered in the inspection. As 
a result of the inspection, STUK concluded that TVO’s instructions and operations meet the 
requirements necessary for implementation.
Disposal facilities, 30 September–1 October 2020
The inspection was focused on the concrete and rock structures of the Olkiluoto power plant’s 
waste disposal repository (VLJ repository), and the related TVO organisation, processes and 
operations, operating instructions, TVO’s own inspections, the status of ongoing investigations 
and maintenance procedures were reviewed during the inspection. During the inspection, 
STUK paid particular emphasis on the adequacy of resources and competence related to the use 
of the VLJ repository.
Based on the inspection, STUK presented three requirements. TVO must, for example, 
submit to STUK a report on the deputy arrangements that will ensure the continuity of the VLJ 
repository’s monitoring, examinations and long-term testing. TVO must also submit to STUK 
a report on how the traceability and transparency of the monitoring material of all the VLJ 
repository research areas and the clarity of reporting can be improved.
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Chemistry, 3–4 November 2020
The inspection assessed the procedures used to maintain and control the chemical conditions 
of systems important to safety and to control the radionuclide concentrations of the reactor 
coolant. Procedures related to the radionuclide-specific determination of the activity 
accumulated on the interior surface of heat exchangers and pipes were examined in particular. 
The inspection also addressed the management of deviations related to chemistry operations. 
The inspection covered all three Olkiluoto plant units, and STUK issued four requirements 
based on it.
During the inspection it was established that TVO uses an external service for nuclide-
specific measurements of the primary circuit’s surface activity. TVO’s Chemistry team is 
responsible for organising and planning the measurements. The inspection covered the 
situation of the measuring equipment as well as the measurement procedures and reporting 
on the results at the OL1 and OL2 plant units. At OL3, the measurement point planning is still 
underway. STUK required that the quality control of the measurements must be traceable 
in the measurement reports submitted to TVO and that procedures must be established for 
the laboratory's subcontracted activities in accordance with TVO’s pre- and post-job briefing 
practice.
The inspection covered the management of deviations in chemistry operations. The 
chemistry laboratory has introduced a new laboratory data system. In connection with 
the introduction of the new data system, the values and action levels of the Technical 
Specifications (TechSpecs) related to hydrochemistry management were entered into the data 
system, as were the quality assurance sample action/alarm limits. When entering sample data 
analysis results into the system, the data system automatically compares the entered result to 
the TechSpec value/action level and, in case of a quality assurance sample, compares the result 
to the action/alert limit. The data system provides the person entering the sample data with an 
immediate respond as to whether or not the result is within the permitted limits. During the 
inspection, it was also established that in addition to Chemistry, sampling is also carried out by 
other organisations. STUK issued a requirement that a verifiable procedure must be established 
to ensure the sampling competence of persons from outside the chemical organisation. 
STUK also required that the verification of laboratory analysis qualifications must be clearly 
described in the Chemistry operating instructions.
Mechanical technology, 13–14 October 2020
The licensee’s activities related to ensuring the integrity and reliable function of mechanical 
equipment and structures are assessed during the mechanical technology inspection. For the 
part of plant units OL1 and OL2, the inspection focused on the auxiliary feedwater system’s 
recirculating line modifications and nuclear hoisting equipment. Based on the inspection, 
STUK presented two requirements.
Due to the upcoming fuel loading, the following issues deemed essential were reviewed 
at OL3: the serviceability of safety class 2 pumps following the long standstill and various 
maintenance and modification tasks, nuclear hoisting equipment, the procedure applied in 
the pipeline condition monitoring and periodic inspections of pressure equipment, and the 
adequacy of the staff’s competence and mechanical training.
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The inspection did not provide full certainly of the operability of OL3’s safety class 2 
pumps in the above-mentioned situations. According to TVO, the pumps normal periodic 
tests will be started already before fuel loading, and will continue throughout the nuclear test 
operation and also after the launch of commercial operation. TVO must present justifications 
on how these periodic tests or, if necessary, additional inspections and tests can ensure the 
serviceability of the pumps under all design basis conditions before the start of commercial 
operation. The justifications must be submitted to STUK for information before fuel loading.
The test runs related to the OL1/2’s auxiliary feedwater system’s recirculating line 
modifications revealed inoperability of measuring equipment, in relation to which STUK 
required TVO to submit to STUK for information a plan and schedule for repairing the 
measuring equipment. 
Interim storage of spent nuclear fuel 28–29 October 2020
The inspection focused on the operation of the interim storage of spent fuel (KPA storage), the 
modification of systems and the ageing management of systems and structures. The inspection 
assessed the current state of use and modifications of the KPA storage as well as future 
modification work. The inspection also covered the responsibilities and authorities of various 
TVO organisations involved in the use of the KPA storage.
Based on the inspection, the operating activities related to the KPA storage appear to be 
clear and the responsibilities of the various organisations are described in the administrative 
rules of the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant. Responsibilities have been defined for several 
different organisational levels and tasks.
The inspection also covered the ageing of KPA storage systems and structures, system 
managers and their role in the assessment of ageing, ageing management monitoring and 
reporting and the spare parts situation. During on the inspection, TVO assessed the KPA 
storage systems’ spare parts situation to be good. TVO uses a spare parts process, on the 
basis of which spare parts are purchased. During the inspection, it was established that a 
comprehensive survey of the KPA storage systems’ spare parts situation is underway, including 
the spare parts for the VLJ repository systems and the plant waste systems. No requirements 
were presented based on the inspection.
Plant maintenance, 2–3 December 2020
The sufficiency of the resources, functions and tasks relating to the condition monitoring 
and maintenance of the OL1 and OL2 plant units to ensure safe operation was assessed in the 
inspection. As the commissioning of OL3 is approaching, the status of OL3’s maintenance 
organisation and instructions was also addressed. The inspection focused particularly on the 
human resources of maintenance and the extent and procedures of the plant units’ ageing 
management programme.
In recent years, TVO has reviewed the vocational induction of new maintenance recruits 
and the inspection established that the situation has improved clearly. The sufficiency of the 
maintenance resources and competence will also be monitored in STUK’s future inspections. 
TVO has invested in incorporating the requirements of Guide YVL A.8 into its ageing 
management programme. Progress has been made in the development work, but the provision 
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of information on plant parts remains partly unfinished. No significant deficiencies were 
identified in the inspection. However, some issues remain to be clarified by TVO. 
STUK presented two requirements based on the inspection. TVO must examine from recent 
periodic test result the compliance of the measured performance of all safety class 2 pumps 
with the design basis performance presented in the final safety analysis report (FSAR). The 
compliance must be unambiguously demonstrated to the pump’s operating point defined in 
the FSAR (lifting height vs. flow). Any potential deviations from FSAR must be justified. The 
second requirement was related to bringing TVO organisation’s documentation on strength 
technical competence and resources in line with the current situation and expected future 
needs.
Utilisation of the PRA, 21 October 2020
The inspection concerned the preparation of the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) of the 
nuclear power plant and the procedures relating to its application and the utilisation of PRA 
in the management of safety at the nuclear power plant. In the inspection, the situation 
regarding the PRA models and applications of all Olkiluoto plant units and the KPA storage, 
the extensions and updates under preparation and their schedules were reviewed. In addition, 
the instructions and the operation of the organisation relating to the preparation and 
application of the PRA were assessed in the inspection. Despite staff changes, PRA resources 
have been maintained at the same level as before. Currently, there are no comments on the 
resource situation.
Based on the inspection, it can be stated that the instructions concerning the PRA are up to 
date and the PRA is used in accordance with the plans and in a versatile manner as a support 
for safety management. One requirement was presented based on the inspection. TVO must 
assess the need for updating the risk-informed TechSpec and, if necessary, draw up an updating 
schedule and submit the results of the assessment to STUK for information.
Structures and buildings, 4–5 November 2020
The inspection concerned the use, condition monitoring, maintenance and ageing control of 
structures, buildings and sea water ducts and tunnels. The inspection included an assessment 
of the licensee’s procedures and operations and a review of the results of construction 
inspections and the completed modifications. In this year’s inspection, STUK emphasised the 
management of deviations as part of the organisation’s operations and construction practices.
Based on the inspection, STUK did not issue any requirements, but made some 
observations, the development of which will be monitored in the future. The observations were 
related to the procedures of the receiving inspections, ensuring that the modification work 
material at the construction site is up-to-date, monitoring the validity of approved suppliers’ 
certificates, recording the results of maintenance inspections and managing the repair priority, 
developing the condition monitoring and assessment of inaccessible and restricted structures, 
recording the justifications for closing the handling of operating experience reports, and 
positive operating experience cooperation with Swedish sister plants.
The periodic inspections and renovations of TVO’s power plant buildings’ rooms as well as 
structural modifications have been carried out as planned. Based on the inspection, the use, 
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condition monitoring, maintenance and ageing management of structures and buildings are at 
an adequate level.
Electrical technology, 25–26 November 2020
The electrical technology inspection assessed the licensee's procedures to ensure the reliable 
operation of the nuclear plant’s electrical systems and equipment. The inspection topics 
included the condition monitoring and periodic inspections of safety classified electrical 
equipment carried out by the licensee, the installation inspections and procedures related to 
electrical equipment and cables carried out by the licensee, as well as drafting requirement 
specification and verifying the requirements. The inspection also dealt with open electrical 
issues at OL3, which must be resolved before fuel loading.
During the inspection, TVO presented condition monitoring reporting from its preventative 
maintenance system and also the procedures related to the installation inspections and the 
electrical technology installation inspection organisation. During the inspection, TVO was 
told to pay closer attention to familiarising new installation inspectors with the inspection 
targets and procedures. The inspection also reviewed and verified TVO’s procedures related 
to the preparation of requirement specifications for electrical systems and equipment and to 
communicating and verifying the requirements. 
Based on the inspection, STUK presented three requirements. TVO must include in its 
instructions the procedures for applying the verification table for the compliance of electrical 
systems and equipment with the requirements. TVO must also submit to STUK a plan of 
measures on how to bring the drafting of requirement specifications for electrical systems and 
equipment in line with the instructions. Regarding OL3, TVO was required to report on the 
frequency converter failures during their commissioning and their repairs. The report must be 
submitted to STUK for information before OL3’s fuel loading.
Radiation protection, 6–7 October 2020
The inspection concerning radiation protection focuses on radiation protection, radiation 
measurements and release and environmental monitoring at the nuclear power plant. The 
2020 inspection focused on administrative radiation protection. Particular focus was paid on 
the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant’s ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) activities. The 
inspection covered all Olkiluoto plant units.
STUK had requested TVO to prepare a self-assessment on the implementation of the 
ALARA principles and the currency of the procedures at the power plant. STUK concluded 
that TVO’s report on the matter was carefully prepared and that it identified development 
targets. In the future, the OL3 plant unit and waste management will be more included 
more extensively in the assessment of ALARA activities. Radiation protection procedures in 
deviation management were reviewed during the inspection. The inspection was carried out 
with separate interviews. In STUK’s view, deviations are handled systematically in the area of 
radiation protection, staff is familiar with the instructions for handling plant level deviations 
and observes them.
STUK presented three requirements based on the inspection. These concerned the updating 
of the radiation protection instructions and the radiation source accounting.
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Security arrangements, 1–4 September 2020
The inspection focused on the security arrangements of the Olkiluoto plant units. Inspection 
targets included risk and deviation management, both in terms of physical security 
arrangements and information security. External and internal assessment of information 
security and the implementation of their results were also discussed. Monitoring of person 
traffic, the items brought to the plant site and transport were inspected at the plant gates. 
Information security procedures and ongoing development measures were reviewed at the 
maintenance unit.
Based on the inspection, STUK presented two new requirements and a new deadline was 
set for one requirement issued at an earlier inspection. In order to maintain and improve both 
physical security arrangements and information security procedures, several development 
projects are ongoing and underway at Olkiluoto. STUK considers these to be good and 
necessary.
Safety design, 16–17 September 2020
The inspection focused on TVO’s design activities at the Olkiluoto power plant. The inspection 
covered the organisations involved in the process and I&C design, the procedures used and 
their development needs, as well as the available resources.
The inspection focused in particular on the flow of information between various technical 
fields, the harmonisation of OL3 design practices with those of the OL1 and OL2 plant units, 
and the use of subcontractors. As examples of recent plant modifications, changing the water 
supply of the reactor core’s injection and boron system from above the core to the annulus, the 
project on increasing the heat transfer capacity of the KPA storage and the project on renewing 
the I&C system components to ensure its lifecycle were reviewed.
No requirements were presented based on the inspection. TVO has recently developed 
its design process towards a direction in which model templates are widely used in the 
compilation of the data, which, in STUK’s view, has improved the quality and consistency of 
the data. The flow of information between various technology sectors has improved lately and 
the interaction, particularly in the pre-design stage, has increased from what it was. 
Nuclear material safeguards, 7–8 December 2020
The inspection covered TVO’s nuclear safeguards with regard to the following entities: Nuclear 
material licensing and accountancy and reporting system, enabling regulatory control and 
oversight by international organisations (IAEA, Euratom), TVO’s nuclear material safeguards 
system and organisation. The inspection topics were reviewed through interviews and TVO’s 
example cases.
No requirements were presented based on the inspection. In STUK’s view, TVO's activities 
with regard to nuclear material safeguards are appropriate. For example, STUK considered it 
a good practice that TVO’s personnel responsible for nuclear material safeguards regularly 
provide training on nuclear material safeguards issues to all those who operate within the 
power plant area.
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Annual outage, 10 May–8 June 2020
The inspection verified and assessed the safe implementation of the annual outages of TVO’s 
OL1 and OL2 plant units. Several inspectors from various fields of technology took part in 
the inspection. Due to the COVID-19 epidemic, various sites were monitored via remote 
connections more than usually. 
Inspection topics included updating the operating instructions as a result of modifications, 
radiation protection, installation of the electrical penetration of the containment, 
management of foreign material, and the operation of the organisation and decision-making 
to ensure safety. As a general theme of the inspection, the possible effects of the COVID-19 
epidemic and the resulting measures on the safe execution of the annual outage were also 
observed. 
STUK carried out on-site radiation protection annual outage monitoring at both plant 
units. Based on the monitoring visits, radiation protection measures had been appropriately 
implemented and no comments were made.
STUK verified TVO’s procedures related to the management of foreign material during 
the annual outage on a spot-check basis at the controlled areas of OL1 and OL2 and also by 
monitoring TVO’s reporting on foreign material observations. The observations made by 
STUK at the plant site were mostly positive. TVO’s investment on the development of foreign 
material management is reflected at work areas and the operations of the plant. 
No requirements were presented based on the inspection. According to STUK’s 
observations, TVO’s COVID-19 safety measures did not hinder the safe execution of the annual 
outage work. The COVID-19 measures were taken seriously and TVO reviewed the effects of the 
measures throughout the annual outage. However, TVO postponed some of the work planned 
for the annual outage to the future to ensure the availability of competent workforce and 
necessary parts for the annual outage. All work necessary in terms of safety was carried out in 
accordance with the original plan. STUK considers it important that TVO continues to plan 
the implementation of the postponed work in such a way that the matter will be compensated 
quickly.
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inspections of Olkiluoto 3 in 2020
The Olkiluoto 3 plant unit was dealt with both in the operational readiness inspections and 
inspections specified in the periodic inspection programme because many functions inspected 
are shared by all plant units of Olkiluoto. The periodic inspection programme inspections are 
described in further detail in Appendix 3 and this appendix contains only the inspections 
related to the verification of operational readiness.
The inspections concerning solely the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit were made in accordance 
with the operational readiness inspection plan. The objective of the construction inspection 
programme (RTO) is to verify that the functions required by the construction of the facility 
ensure its high-quality implementation in accordance with approved plans, while following 
the official regulations and without jeopardizing the operating plant units at the plant site 
during the different stages of the construction project. The inspection programme of Olkiluoto 
3 was launched in 2005 when construction of the unit started, and the last RTO inspection was 
performed in November 2017. Because the RTO programme ends in an operating licence and 
it was to be expected that OL3 plant unit gets the licence during spring 2018, no semiannual 
RTO plan was prepared for spring 2018. Instead, a operational readiness inspection plan was 
prepared. Due to delays in the project, the granting of the operating licence was transferred 
to the beginning of 2019. After the operating licence, fuel loading has been transferred several 
times, so STUK has updated and completed the inspection programme based on the project 
schedule and other inspection findings.
Readiness inspection plans are part of the verification of safe use required by Section 20 of 
the Nuclear Energy Act:
Operation of the nuclear facility shall not be started on the basis of a licence granted:
(1) until the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) has ascertained that the nuclear facility 
meets the safety requirements set, that the physical protection and emergency planning are sufficient, that 
the necessary control to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been arranged appropriately, and 
that the licensee of the nuclear facility has, as provided, arranged indemnification regarding liability in 
case of nuclear damage.
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During the year, operational readiness inspections were performed as follows:
Inspection Date
Security arrangement 18–21 August 2020
17–18 November 2020
7–10 December 2020
Operating Manual for the plant and procedures 
related to severe accident management
27–28 April 2020
Review of emergency response arrangements 3 June 2020
Spare parts situation review 13–14 July 2020
Management system 22–23 September 2020
Control room readiness 1–3 December 2020
The security arrangement inspections assessed the operational readiness of the Olkiluoto 
3 plant unit from the point of view of the implementation of the security arrangements. The 
inspections focused, among other things, on the state of information security, management 
of keys and alarm centre operations. Based on the inspection, STUK concluded that in terms 
of security arrangements, the plant is not yet ready for fuel loading. Based on the inspection, 
previous requirements were closed, for example, based on evidence gained from exercise 
activities. Regarding security arrangements, further inspections will be carried out to verify 
the plant’s fuel loading readiness in 2021.
While inspecting the plant’s Operating Manual, STUK assessed TVO’s methods through 
which TVO has formed its opinion on the readiness and suitability of the plant’s Operating 
Manual and severe accident management procedure. In addition, TVO’s methods and resources 
for maintaining and developing the plant’s operating instructions as well as the administrative 
guidelines on plant disturbances prepared by TVO were assessed during the inspection. Based 
on the inspection, STUK concluded that the plant’s key Operating Manual have been shown 
to be suitable for their intended purpose. However, the instructions are not yet in all respects 
ready for nuclear fuel loading. TVO has surveyed and scheduled all unfinished work to be 
completed before fuel loading. In its inspection protocol, STUK issued requirements regarding 
the completion of unfinished work before fuel loading. STUK also presented requirements for 
ensuring the functioning of the severe accident management procedure and managing I&C 
disturbances. 
The review of the emergency arrangements verified that TVO’s OL3 plant unit’s emergency 
arrangements have been brought into readiness for operation in accordance with the 
emergency plan. STUK concluded that the emergency arrangements of TVO’s OL3 plant unit 
are in accordance with the emergency plan.
The spare parts situation required by the YVL Guides was reviewed. Based on this review, 
the situation has improved since the previous spare parts inspection. STUK will carry out 
another review regarding the spare parts before fuel loading to verify the plant’s readiness for 
fuel loading.
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The completion of instructions and the training situation were among matters reviewed 
during the management system inspection. Based on the inspection, in terms of management 
system, the plant is not yet ready for fuel loading, but progress had been made. STUK will 
conduct a review on open issues before fuel loading to verify the plant’s readiness for fuel 
loading.
STUK inspected OL3 control rooms’ and control room activities’ readiness for the launch 
of operations of the nuclear power plant. The scope of the inspection included the OL3 
unit’s entire control room entity, including the monitoring and control user interfaces in the 
control room, the instructions applied by the control room operators and the procedures and 
practices applied in the control room. As a positive finding, STUK observed that TVO has 
clearly assumed the lead in operating the OL3 nuclear plant. TVO’s shift supervisor manages 
control room operations while the line management has ownership of the plant’s operations. 
The plant supplier’s and TVO’s responsibilities for the running of the plant are clearly defined 
and the division of responsibilities is observed. Progress was detected in the control room’s 
preparedness to achieve fuel loading readiness, but matters had not yet progressed to such 
level to allow fuel loading readiness to be established. STUK will verify open issues and the 
plant’s fuel loading readiness before fuel loading.
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processing of Fennovoima’s 
construction licence application 2020
STUK inspects and assesses the management systems of Fennovoima and the other 
organisations participating in the project. Furthermore, STUK performs inspections of the 
organisations to ensure that their actual operations comply with what is specified in the 
management systems and that they meet the necessary requirements. STUK launched the 
inspections included in the regulatory inspection programme (RKT) in September 2015. The 
inspections are planned every six months, and in 2020, STUK carried out eight inspections 
according to its inspection programme. 
There was no need to postpone or cancel the processing of matters due to the COVID-19 
pandemic, as all 2020 inspections were carried out remotely. With regard to the transition 
to remote inspections and based on the experiences from the first remote inspections, STUK 
made some changes to the detailed implementation and running of the inspections. The 
results of the inspections will be used by STUK when preparing a safety assessment and 
statement on the construction licence.
Summaries of the inspections performed in 2020 are presented below.
Fennovoima, I&C technology
The I&C technology inspection in April was the first RKT inspection carried out by STUK as a 
remote inspection. 
During the inspection, STUK stated that Fennovoima’s I&C technology operates in 
accordance with the instructions and procedures of Fennovoima’s management system and 
the current I&C specific instructions and checklists are sufficient, taking into account the 
current stage of the I&C design. Fennovoima must complete the work it has started to draw up 
instructions and lists, inspect the actual I&C data and monitor the I&C lifecycle.
RAOS Project Oy, inspection procedures and safety assessment
STUK carried out its first international remote inspection to RAOS Project Oy. Plant supplier’s 
and main designer’s experts from Helsinki, St. Petersburg and Moscow participated in the 
inspection remotely. STUK observed some positive developments in the plant supplier’s 
internal information portal, in the management of interfaces between different areas and in 
document management. Three old requirements were closed during the inspection and two 
new requirements opened.
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One of the new requirements is a specification to a previous requirement on configuration 
management that was closed in the same inspection. STUK requires that construction licence 
application materials submitted for construction licence application material inspection and 
safety assessment must be based on the same frozen baseline configuration.
The other new requirement relates to the organisation of the plant supplier. RAOS 
Project Oy must assess the maturity of RAOS organisation, management system and project 
management to ensure that the roles and interactions of project organisations are defined and 
clearly communicated both in RAOS organisation and in Hanhikivi 1 project. Furthermore, 
RAOS has to assess its process and organisational structures, the roles of various organisations 
and its human resources and competence needs for future project phases. The assessments 
must take into account the project’s long-term plans and the experiences gained thus far. STUK 
stressed that RAOS should actively develop its long-term project plans, taking into account 
all coming project phases. Based on these assessments, RAOS must develop a plan for possible 
corrective measures. Fennovoima must assess the assessment made by RAOS and the plan for 
corrective measures.
Fennovoima: Leadership, personnel and competence, and handling of safety matters
The inspection focused on the management of Fennovoima (FV) and the organisation of its 
operations as well as the procedures in the handling of safety matters. The inspection covered 
the consequences of the extensive organisational change carried out at Fennovoima in 2019, as 
well as management and organisational measures for identifying, monitoring and processing 
safety matters. The status of open matters in selected previous inspections was verified during 
the inspection. The inspection was carried out using remote connections.
In connection with the above-mentioned organisational change and the subsequent 
development of various processes (including control and core processes), STUK estimates 
that Fennovoima has assumed more leadership in safety-related matters of the project. At the 
same time, it was discovered that FV’s process development is still under way. STUK stated 
that the processes are part of perceiving the overall picture of the organisation’s activities, and 
the operational status can be assessed and developed from the starting points formed by the 
existing processes. FV stated that process development is one way of perceiving FV’s internal 
dialogue and communication. STUK will monitor Fennovoima’s process development during 
autumn 2020 RKT inspections.
The role of FV’s new Oversight function was also discussed during the inspection. In order 
to monitor the development of the Oversight function, thematic monitoring meetings have 
been arranged with FV in autumn 2020.
No new requirements were presented based on the inspection. One previous requirement 
concerning the assessment of the plant supplier’s preliminary safety analysis report 
preparation project (PLP) was closed during the inspection. Fennovoima had carried out the 
required assessment and stated it was useful in the inspection. The previous requirement 
concerning the plant’s uniform identification system was handled during the inspection, but 
remained open. During the inspection, it was observed that some progress had been made in 
the procedures for the identification system. The unambiguous identification system must be 
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in use and its instructions must be provided to STUK so that they are available in connection 
with the processing of system descriptions.
Fennovoima, Nuclear material, Safeguards
The inspection focused on Fennovoima’s nuclear safeguards system and Fennovoima’s plans 
for arranging the necessary safeguards to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
Fennovoima’s plans and procedures to comply with the requirements set in legislation, the YVL 
Guides and EU regulations were assessed during the inspection.
The audit focused on the nuclear safeguards system and the processes related to the 
application for nuclear material licences and licensing conditions. Requirements related to 
the updating and reporting of the safeguards manual and the approval of the deputy for the 
responsible manager for nuclear material safeguards were issued during the inspection. During 
the inspection, a requirement was also issued stating that Fennovoima must draw up procedure 
for organising access rights to international inspectors.
Fennovoima, Electrical technology
The inspection focused on the safety issues of Fennovoima’s electrical and emergency power 
systems. The inspection focused on the control and monitoring carried out by Fennovoima 
regarding chapter PSAR 8 of the preliminary safety evaluation. The general situation of 
Fennovoima’s electrical technology and Fennovoima’s control and monitoring of the design 
and construction licence application material were reviewed during the inspection. The 
inspection also focused on the control and monitoring activities of Fennovoima’s emergency 
power supply equipment’s design and construction licence application.
Based on the inspection, STUK issued two new requirements, one focused on Fennovoima’s 
quality plans and the other on the evaluation of the conformity of the construction licence 
application and design material. The previous requirement concerning the emergency power 
supply equipment’s RKT inspection was closed. 
Titan-2 
During the inspection, main contractor Titan-2’s management and operations in St. 
Petersburg, Pyhäjoki and Helsinki were evaluated. This was a follow-up inspection, reviewing 
the status of requirements selected during the previous inspection and verifying with 
examples the operation of various project and design management processes. The inspection 
and the related preliminary tasks and interviews were carried out remotely. With the exception 
of the requirement to utilise previous construction related operating experiences, all of the 
previous requirements could be closed based on the inspection. New requirements were opened 
on submitting clarifications and interpretations of the requirements of the nuclear safety 
regulations to Titan-2 and incorporating experiences gained from the construction of other 
nuclear power plants into the training programme.
Fennovoima, Inspection procedures
The inspection focused on Fennovoima’s inspection procedures. The inspection included 
human factors engineering (HFE), deterministic safety analyses, probabilistic risk analysis 
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(PRA) and compliance and technical configuration management. The status of open matters in 
selected previous inspections was reviewed during the inspection.
Based on the open requirements for the management of the requirements and technical 
configuration reviewed during the inspection and the discussions, one of the main conclusions 
was that the main designer’s plant design process does not create continuous trust from the 
perspective of quality production. This is reflected, among other things, in the small number 
of phase reviews related to design. The first phase review is carried out in stage 1 of submitting 
the preliminary safety analysis report, once all of the construction licence application material 
has been produced. As this is only one stage, it carries a very high workload and no quality 
management component evaluations are carried out during this stage via review procedure. In 
practice, quality is verified from the finished design documentation and through audits. 
STUK’s inspection team reminded that according to requirement 311 of YVL Guide B.1, a 
nuclear power plant and the systems important to safety shall be designed by using design 
processes and methods appropriate for the required level of quality, and by applying the 
relevant safety regulations, guidelines and standards. The standards applied as well as the 
suitability and coverage of the components shall be substantiated.
One aspect of the inspection was Fennovoima’s inspection procedures to ensure human 
factors engineering. STUK’s inspection concluded that the human factors engineering (HFE) 
carried out by the plant supplier in the plant design does not meet the Finnish standard. Based 
on the inspection, Fennovoima’s own design review procedure is also not adequate to provide 
sufficient assurance on human factors engineering during the construction licence application 
phase and to compensate for the shortcomings observed in the plant supplier’s HFE operations. 
However, STUK did not present any new requirements in this regard during the inspection, as 
there are open requirements related to HFE operations in other contexts (such as the review of 
the draft safety report), which also cover the deficiencies identified during the inspection.
Fennovoima: Leadership and management system
The inspection covered Fennovoima’s management system, as well as its evaluation and 
development, for example, from the point of view of the comprehensive implementation 
of safety functions and taking into account the safety significance of the functions. The 
inspection covered the management of deviations from both Fennovoima’s operation and 
project implementation perspectives. In addition, Fennovoima’s rewarding principles and 
reviews related to plant design were reviewed.
STUK observed that Fennovoima’s management system is starting to form a logical entity. 
The way Fennovoima assesses its construction readiness and, as a part of this, the conformity 
of its management system, has not yet been clearly understood, and a requirement was issued 
on this matter during the inspection. Based on the inspection, two other requirements were 
also issued concerning the slow progress of Fennovoima’s own monitoring, i.e. the slow 
progress of the definition of the Oversight function, and the lack of a uniform view on the 
deviation management procedure.
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Construction inspection programme 
for the encapsulation plant and 
the disposal facility 2020
In 2020, licensing and construction oversight project PORA regarding Posiva’s spent fuel 
disposal project systematically continued the inspections included in the construction 
inspection programme (CIP). The aim of these inspections was to assess the functionality of 
Posiva’s management system as well as the sufficiency and appropriateness of the procedures 
for implementing and controlling the plant construction work and for taking the safety 
requirements into account in the project. Inspections included in the programme may also be 
targeted at Posiva’s suppliers that are important to safety. The 2020 inspections only focused 
on the licensee’s operations. 
The 2020 programme included six inspections on current activities important to the safety 
of the construction phase. The number of inspections remained at the level of the previous 
year. No significant changes have taken place in Posiva’s operations, and for this reason, STUK 
decided to focus its 2020 inspections on the assessment of Posiva’s basic operations. Based 
on the results of STUK’s inspection, it was noted that Posiva’s operations and management 
system procedures in the assessed areas of operation are sufficiently compliant with STUK’s 
requirements. 
Brief descriptions of the inspections as well as the key observations made, based on which 
STUK has required Posiva to carry out improvements and development actions, are presented 
below. The inspections assessed Posiva’s nuclear facilities’ commissioning and preparing for 
production, monitoring programme, safety arrangements, design activities, procurement and 
product control, as well as nuclear material safeguards.
Commissioning and preparing for production
The commissioning and preparing for production inspection covered Posiva’s plans and 
measures related to preparing for production and commissioning. The inspection paid 
particular attention to schedules, guidelines, organisational matters, resources and training. 
The inspection also covered ageing management plans for the operating phase as well as 
radiation protection arrangements. Posiva has started the planning of activities related to 
preparing for production and commissioning, and these are sufficient in relation to the project 
stage. On the basis of the inspection, STUK presented no requirements. The development of 
matters covered during the inspection will be monitored during coming inspections.
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Olkiluoto monitoring programme
The inspection of the Olkiluoto monitoring programme covered the updating of the 
monitoring programme for 2020–2021, the design of the monitoring of technical barriers and 
the management and control of the safety-classified materials used by Posiva. In these respects, 
the inspection concluded that the development of limits and requirements is ongoing and that 
the work aims at defining unambiguous limits for the operating phase. 
In the monitoring of technical barriers, the inspection focused on the monitoring strategy 
and human resources. Based on the inspection, it was concluded that the requirement of 
Section 33 of Regulation STUK Y/4/2018 for the operating phase research and monitoring 
programme to ensure the functional capacity of barriers is met, but the operating phase 
activities must be further developed.  
For the part of the safety-classified materials, the review covered the use of alternative 
safety-classified materials as well as guidelines on approval procedures and criteria. As 
regards the use of alternative materials, Posiva was required to update the guidelines so that 
alternative, less harmful materials must be sought regularly in connection with construction 
activities. Posiva was also required to update the guideline on the approval procedures and 
criteria of materials.
Security arrangements and information security of Posiva’s nuclear facilities
The construction inspection programme (CIP) inspection focused on Posiva’s physical 
protection and information security, especially for the part of the encapsulation plant. The 
fencing arrangements of the disposal facility were also inspected. Two requirements were 
presented in the inspection and three observations were made. In accordance with the 
Framework Contract, Posiva relies heavily on TVO’s arrangements on the administrative, 
technical and physical implementation of security arrangements, and the procedures are 
largely the same. This yields clear synergy benefits, but also poses certain challenges. From the 
perspective of security arrangements, Posiva’s situation is at an acceptable level in terms of the 
licence and construction phase.
Design activities
The CIP inspection focusing on design activities covered the integration of the HFE 
programme into design, the integration of failure tolerance analyses and other analyses into 
design processes, as well as the adequacy of Posiva’s available human resources and resource 
planning with regard to design activities.
Based on the inspection, STUK presented two requirements related to the HFE programme. 
These requirements were related to the fact that Posiva started planning and implementing 
the HFE programme at a late stage, so it cannot be considered to be carried out in a timely 
manner. In addition, Posiva has yet to plan at a sufficient level of detail how the effectiveness 
of the HFE programme can be ensured now that all other design activities are well advanced 
and only the first stages of HFE planning (design and analysis) are underway.
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In the part of the inspection concerning analyses, it was discovered that Posiva has not 
described the procedure for ensuring that the results of analyses are taken into account in the 
design. STUK presented one requirement related to this issue.
During the inspection, it was established that Posiva’s resource planning is sufficiently 
planned and systematic. Resource planning procedures and effectiveness have improved from 
what they were a few years ago.
Management system: Procurement and product control
The CIP inspection on procurement and product control investigated how Posiva’s 
procurement and product control procedures comply with the requirements of the YVL Guides 
and verified how Posiva has observed the procedures in its operations. In the cases reviewed 
during the inspection, deficiencies were found in the assignment’s definition of duties, design 
work guidance and product control. It was verified that in the procurement of the handling cell 
liners, the requirements of the YVL Guides were sufficiently fulfilled in view of procurement 
and product control. Posiva had initiated corrective measures to improve activities for the part 
of deficiencies discovered, so no requirements were presented during the inspection.
Safeguards arrangements at Posiva’s nuclear facilities
The nuclear safeguards inspection focused on Posiva’s nuclear material accounting and 
database software developed for accounting purposes. The inspection covered activities related 
to the production and processing of accounting records required for nuclear safeguards in view 
of the current situation and future development. Based on the inspection, Posiva’s activities do 
not currently differ from the Nuclear Safety Code. The presented requirements concern future 
activities. One good practice was also recorded during the inspection.
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Licences STUK has granted in 
accordance with the Nuclear 
Energy Act in 2020
Teollisuuden Voima Oy
• 1/C42214/2020, 20 March 2020: Import of a dummy fuel element from the USA. Last date of 
validity 31 December 2021.
• 2/C42214/2020, 26 March 2020: OL1/OL2 – Import of rotors from Germany. Last date of 
validity 31 December 2022.
• 3/C42214/2020, 30 March 2020: OL1/OL2 – Import of SIRM protective tubes from Germany 
and Sweden. Last date of validity 31 December 2038.
• 1/G42214/2020, 29 September 2020: OL3 – Transfer of country of origin restricted (Russia) 
data set on fuel. Last date of validity 31/12/2025.
• 1/D42214/2020, 29 September 2020: OL2 e 39 “S” Import of fuel assemblies 31287 and 31288 
that had been repaired Last date of validity 31 December 2021.
• 2/D42214/2020, 1 October 2020: Import of fresh nuclear fuel with Euratom obligation code 
“C” from Sweden (OL2 e 41 ”C”). Last date of validity 31 December 2021.
• 3/D42214/2020, 14 September 2020: Import of fresh nuclear fuel with Euratom obligation 
code “P” from Sweden (OL2 e 41 ”P”). Last date of validity 31 December 2021.
• 5/C42214/2020, 29 September 2020: Import of fresh nuclear fuel with Euratom obligation 
code “T” from Spain (batch OL1 e 43 “T”). Last date of validity 31 December 2021.
• 2/G42214/2020, 2 October 2020: Import of fresh nuclear fuel with Euratom obligation code 
“P” from Germany (batch OL3 e 02 “P”). Last date of validity 31 December 2021.
• 6/C42214/2020, 4 November 2020: OL1/OL2 – Import of fuel channels from Sweden or the 
United States. Last date of validity 31 December 2030.
• 7/C42214/2020, 30 October 2020: Import of a dummy fuel element from Spain (amendment 
to import licence 1/C42214/2020). Last date of validity 31 December 2021.
• 3/G42214/2020, 5 November 2020: Import of fresh nuclear fuel with Euratom obligation code 
“P” from Germany (batch OL3 e 02 “P”). Replaces import licence 2/G42214/2020. Last date of 
validity 31 December 2021.
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• 2/A42214/2020, 15 May 2020: Import of in-core neutron flux sensors from Canada. Last date 
of validity 30 June 2021.
• 5/A42214/2020, 20 October 2020: Export of nuclear waste samples to Denmark. Last date of 
validity 31 December 2022.
• 7/Y42214/2020, 2 October 2020: Possession and transfer of country of origin restricted 
(Russia) data sets regarding OL3 fuel. Last date of validity 31 December 2025. 
Posiva Oy
• 1/H42214/2020, 12 February 2020: Import of fuel element models and fuel channels from 
Sweden. Last date of validity 31 December 2020
Fennovoima Ltd
• 1/J42214/2020, 4 September 2020: Transfer of country of origin restricted (Russia) data sets. 
Last date of validity 31 December 2023.
• 2/J42214/2020, 4 September 2020: Amendment to an import and possession licence 2/
J42214/2018 on country of origin restricted (Russia) data sets. Last date of validity 31/12/2028.
VTT
• 1/F42214/2020, 16 December 2020: Export of the spent nuclear fuel from the FiR 1 research 
reactor. Last date of validity 30 June 2022.
• 2/F46201/2020, 19 May 2020: Transport of spent nuclear fuel. Last date of validity 30 April 
2025.
Others
• 1/Y42214/2020, 6 February 2020: Joint Stock Company Concern Titan-2 import, possession 
and transfer of country of origin restricted (Russia) data set. Last date of validity 31 
December 2028.
• 1/Y46201/2020, 18 March 2020: Studsvik Nuclear AB, transport of fresh nuclear fuel through 
Finnish territory from Russia to Sweden. Last date of validity 31 December 2024
• 6/Y42214/2020, 22 October 2020: RAOS Oy, import, possession and transfer of country of 
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